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The Federal "Claim"
in the District Courts:
Osborn, Verlinden,
and Protective Jurisdiction
Carlos M. Vazquezf
In the title of his influential article, "The Federal 'Question' in the
District Courts,"' Professor Paul Mishkin placed scare quotes around the
word "question" to remind us that the phrase "federal question" is a
misnomer as a description ofthe "arising under" jurisdiction ofthe district
courts. He criticized the oft-repeated dictum that a case does not arise
under federal law unless it truly involves a disputed issue of federal law,
noting that this formulation of the "arising under" test "stems from an
uncritical transference to the lower federal courts of a standard developed
for the exercise ofthe Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction."^ In fact, it is
clear that a case arises under federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331
if the plaintiff raises a federal claim—that is, if his cause of action is
created by federal law—even if everyone agrees about the proper
interpretation of federal law and the only disputes concem the meaning of
state law or the facts. That is as it should be. The purpose of the "arising
undfer" jurisdiction ofthe district courts is not solely, or even primarily, to
resolve disputed questions of federal law, but to provide a hospitable forum
for the vindication of federal rights. Such rights can be fhistrated by an
inhospitable fomm not just through the misinterpretation of federal law,
but through misinterpretation of state law or through biased fact-fmding.
For this reason. Professor Mishkin acknowledged that, in place ofthe term

Copyright © 2007 California Law Review, Inc. Califomia Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
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John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I atn grateful
for helpful comments from Vicki Jackson, Jonathan Molot, and David Vladeck, and the participants in
this symposium. I am especially grateful for the thoughtful responses of Emest Young in this
symposium. I dedicate this Article to Paul Mishkin, for his inspiration and his encouragement.
1. Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157
(1953).
2. W. at 170.
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"federal question," "[a]ccuracy . . . would be better served by some such
term as'federal c/a//w."'^
This was a central insight of the first part of Professor Mishkin's
article, discussing the scope ofthe statutory grant of federal "arising under"
jurisdiction.'' In my view. Professor Mishkin's insight is also the key to
understanding the proper scope of the "arising under" clause of Article
III— the topic of the second part of his article. The failure to keep this
point in mind explains much of the broad, controversial language in
Osborn v. Bank ofthe United States,^ language that the Supreme Court and
commentators have subsequently hesitated to embrace. That broad
language reflects Chief Justice Marshall's misguided conception of Osborn
as a "federal question" case. Had he viewed Osborn as a "federal claim"
case, he could have upheld the statute in somewhat narrower terms. Indeed,
much of his analysis, including his famous "original ingredient" language,*
can be usefully understood through a "federal claim" lens.
More recently, in Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria,^ in
considering the validity of a statute conferring jurisdiction over cases
brought by aliens against foreign states, the Court adhered to Marshall's
"federal question" paradigm but distanced itself from Osborn's "remote
possibility" test. It upheld the statute on the theory that every case that the
statute permitted to be adjudicated in the federal courts involved an actual
question of federal law, namely, whether the foreign state was entitled to
immunity under the standards of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA).^ This holding is unsatisfying because, under the statute, there is no
need for the court to consider any question of foreign sovereign immunity
if the defendant appears but does not raise an immunity defense. In such
cases, there would be no colorable issue of federal law, and therefore no
true "federal question." I argue that a "federal claim" analysis would have
yielded a more persuasive rationale for upholding the statute.
Part I of this Article explains why the "federal question" analysis in
Osborn is unpersuasive, and how a "federal claim" analysis would have
provided a more convincing, and narrower, rationale for the holding. I
argue that the jurisdictional grant in Osborn should have been upheld
because all claims by the Bank were created by federal law—the federal
law creating the Bank and giving it all of its powers—and that Congress
properly conferred jurisdiction over the claims in order to provide a more
hospitable forum for the vindication of such rights. Part II explains why the
3. W. at 171 (emphasis in original). He nevertheless opted to use the "more conventional term
'federal question'" in his article. Id. at n.61.
4. Id at 168-76.
5. 22 U.S. 738(1824).
6. Id. at 824.
7. 461 U.S. 480(1983).
8. W. at 492-94.

2007]

THE FEDERAL "CLAIM" IN THE DISTRICT COURTS

1733

Court's "federal question" analysis in Verlinden is similarly unpersuasive
and how a "federal claim" analysis would once again have produced a
more convincing decision. The jurisdictional grant should have been
upheld in Verlinden because all claims against foreign states are created by
federal law—the federal law partially withdrawing the immunity that
foreign states had always enjoyed by virtue of international law, as
construed by our courts. Verlinden differs from Osborn in that Congress
conferred jurisdiction to provide a less hospitable forum for those raising
claims against foreign states. I conclude that this is an equally valid reason
to confer jurisdiction over federally-created claims.
Part III explores the outer boundaries of federal claim theory. I
conclude that federal claim analysis supports a congressional grant of
jurisdiction over any class of cases over which Congress has legislative
power. Congress may confer jurisdiction over such cases by creating a
federal claim that adopts or incorporates as federal law whatever state or
foreign law would otherwise govem the dispute. The effective scope of
Congress's power under the adoption approach would be the same as under
Professor Wechsler's version of protective jurisdiction. My proposed
refmement of Wechsler's approach, though largely formal, helps address
some of the objections that have been directed at it. Professor Wechsler
was right when he claimed that the greater power to confer jurisdiction by
displacing state law includes the lesser power to confer jurisdiction without
displacing state law. Federal claim analysis shows that Congress may
confer jurisdiction over claims it creates in order to make available a more
(or less) hospitable forum for the adjudication of such claims. That
justification for conferring jurisdiction is also compelling when the federal
claim that Congress has created is to be resolved by reference to federal
law that does not differ in content from the state or foreign law that would
otherwise apply.
I
OSBORN

Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Osborn has come to stand for the
broad principle that a suit arises under federal law for purposes of Article
Ill's "arising under" clause if there is any possibility that a disputed
question of federal law will emerge during the course ofthe case. This Part
first reviews Osborn's holding, and then addresses why a "federal claim"
analysis would have been preferable.
A. Osbom as a "Federal Question " Case
Osborn concemed the constitutionality of a statute conferring
jurisdiction on the federal district courts in any suit brought by the Bank of
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the United States.' The substantive issue in Osborn was federal too, but
Chief Justice Marshall was not content to uphold the statute as applied. He
considered at length whether the grant of jurisdiction would have been
valid in a hypothetical case govemed substantively by state law. He posited
a case brought by the Bank to enforce a contract (which was not entirely
hypothetical, as it was the posture of a companion case. Bank ofthe United
States V. Planters' Bank of Georgia^'').
In analyzing the constitutional issue, the Court zeroed in on the nature
ofthe questions to be decided in the case." The appellants had argued that
the jurisdictional grant was invalid because a suit brought by the Bank
could be expected to raise non-federal as well as federal questions.'^
Marshall properly rejected that argument as untenable, noting that Article
Ill's "arising under" provision limits the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as well as the original jurisdiction ofthe federal courts, and
the Court's appellate jurisdiction is of course not negated by the fact that
the case involves non-federal issues in addition to federal ones.'^ Marshall
then reasoned that, because the original jurisdiction of the federal courts
has to be decided at the commencement of the case, when it is unclear
which issues will be disputed. Congress has the power to confer federal
jurisdiction over any case in which there is a possibility that a question of
federal law will be raised.'''
Thus, in considering the case of a contract action brought by the Bank,
the Court focused on the nature ofthe questions to be decided:
When a Bank sues, the first question which presents itself, and
which lies at the foundation of its cause is, has this legal entity a
right to sue? . . . This depends on a law of the United States. The
next question is, has this being a right to make this particular
contract? If this question be decided in the negative, the cause is
determined against the plaintiff; and this question too depends on a
law of the United States. These are important questions and they
exist in any possible case.'^ ,:.
It did not matter that the questions were not actually raised in the case:
The right to sue, if decided oncfe, is decided for ever; but the power
of Congress was exercised antecedently to the first decision on that
right, and if it was constitutional then, it cannot cease to be so,
because the particular question is decided. It may be revived at the
will of the party, and most probably would be renewed, were the
9. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 738.
10. 22 U.S. 904(1824).
11. O^Aora, 22 U.S. at 745.
12. W. at 819.
13. W. at 820-22.
14. W. at 821-23.
15. W. at 823-24.
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tribunal to be changed. . . . The question forms an original
ingredient in every cause. Whether it be in fact relied on or not, in
the defence, it is still a part ofthe cause, and may be relied on. . . .
The questions which the case involves, then, must determine its
character, whether those questions be made in the cause or not.'*
Marshall's opinion in Osborn has been read as maintaining that a suit
arises under federal law for purposes of Article III as long as there is a
possibility that a disputed question of federal law will arise in the case.
Indeed, some have described the Osborn test as being satisfied by the
"remote possibility" that a federal question will be raised.'^ Those who
have read Osborn this way have been reluctant to embrace the test. Thus,
Justice Frankfiirter, dissenting in Lincoln Mills, expressed skepticism about
Osborn's holding, which he described as recognizing that "Congress may
confer [federal arising under jurisdiction] whenever there exists in the
background some federal proposition that might be challenged, despite the
remoteness of the likelihood of actual presentation of such a federal
question."'^ Similarly, the Court in Verlinden, after describing Osborn as
having held that "Congress may confer on the federal courts jurisdiction
over any case or controversy that might call for the application of federal
law,"" noted that "[tjhe breadth of that conclusion has been questioned"^^
(quoting Frankfurter's "remote possibility" reading), and concluded that it
did not have to decide the "precise boundaries" of Article III in the case
before it.^'
It is not surprising that the "remote possibility" test has encountered
substantial resistance among courts and scholars. Such a test imposes no
limit at all on Congress's ability to confer original jurisdiction on the
federal courts. Any case govemed by state law raises at least the remote
possibility of a federal question arising - for example, the question of the
state law's constitutionality, or questions about whether state procedures
comply with federal constitutional requirements. An interpretation of
Article Ill's "arising under" provision as authorizing Congress to confer
jurisdiction over virtually any case govemed by state law would be
untenable, as it would be inconsistent with the Founders' decision to
extend federal jurisdiction only to a limited set of cases.
It is far from clear that Marshall actually contemplated a "remote
possibility" test. For example, he took pains to explain that his holding
would not necessarily require the upholding of a statute conferring
16. W. at 824.
17. Textile Union Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 482 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
18. Id. at 471 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
19. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 492.
20. Id.
21. W. at 493.
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jurisdiction over any case brought by a naturalized citizen^^—a statute that
would appear to be valid under a "remote possibility" test. Nevertheless,
Marshall's focus on the need to resolve federal questions, and his
conclusion that federal jurisdiction can be based on those questions even if
they are not raised in the case, seem amenable to the broad interpretation
that has rightly given courts and commentators pause.
Justice Johnson, dissenting in Osborn, also focused on the nature of
the questions involved in the case as determining whether the case arises
under federal law. He agreed with Marshall that the existence of nonfederal questions did not vitiate "arising under" jurisdiction,^'' but rejected
Marshall's suggestion that federal questions could confer jurisdiction even
if not raised in the case. In his view, federal jurisdiction could not be based
"on a mere hypothesis,"^"* that is, "merely on the ground that a [federal]
question might possibly be raised."^^ The federal district courts had to be
authorized to resolve questions of federal law, but they did not have to be
available for cases in which no such questions were in fact raised. He
suggested, reasonably, that if the federal questions did not appear in the
plaintiffs complaint, then federal jurisdiction could be exercised through
removal ofthe case from state court once the federal question was raised.^*
If Marshall and Johnson were correct in their apparent assumption that
"arising under" jurisdiction depended on the nature of the legal questions
to be resolved, then Johnson's position was certainly the more defensible.
Federal jurisdiction would have been available under Johnson's approach
for those cases truly implicating that purpose, while the jurisdiction of the
state courts would have been preserved for cases not implicating it. But
Marshall and Johnson both appear to have overlooked another important
purpose of "arising under" jurisdiction, a far more important purpose ofthe
federal district courts than resolving issues of federal law—^providing a
hospitable forum for the vindication of federal rights. This purpose is
implicated even when there is no disputed issue of federal law in the case.
It is implicated whenever one ofthe parties relies on federal law. This idea
underlies Justice Holmes's construction of the general "arising under"
statute: a suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.^^ This
formulation is regarded as valid as a rule of inclusion, if not as a mle of
exclusion.^^ Any case that would fall within the "arising under" statute as
constmed by Holmes must, of course, fall within the "arising under" clause
of Article III.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Osborn, 22 U.S. at 827.
Id. at 884 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 874 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 889 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler, 241 U.S. 257,260 (1916).
T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964).
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B. Osbom as a "Federal Claim " Case

That Marshall and Johnson failed to recognize the vindication of
federal rights as an important purpose of "arising under" jurisdiction is
perhaps attributable to the fact that there was no statute conferring a
general "arising under" jurisdiction on the federal courts at the time. The
constitutional "arising under" provision had been implemented primarily
through the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state court
judgments, and the Supreme Court had constmed Article III primarily in
that context. It is thus understandable that the Court might uncritically
transfer an analysis tailored to its own appellate jurisdiction to a statute
conferring original jurisdiction on a lower court.
Had Marshall and Johnson acknowledged that one of the purposes of
federal "arising under" jurisdiction under Article III was to provide a
hospitable fomm for the vindication of federal rights, they might have
found the statute before them to be a particularly appropriate use of
Congress's power under that clause. As Johnson noted in his dissent,
jurisdiction was needed because of state court hostility to the Bank.'^'
Marshall's statement that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
would be inadequate because by then the case would have been "shaped"
adversely to federal interests by the state courts was a more subtle
acknowledgement of the need to protect it from possible state court
hostility.^" These considerations should have led the Court to uphold the
statute not because ofthe possibility that propositions of federal law might
be disputed in cases brought by the Bank, but because all suits brought by
the Bank seek to vindicate federal rights—the federal right of the Bank to
contract and engage in the other operations authorized by the act of
incorporation.^' Because state court hostility to the Bank threatened to
frustrate these federal rights, congressional conferral of jurisdiction over
these claims advanced one of the core purposes of the constitutional
"arising under" provision.
One possible objection to this analysis would build on Justice
Frankfurter's observation that the Framers of Article III anticipated the
possibility of bias against certain parties and authorized federal jurisdiction
in certain circumstances to guard against such bias.^^ Such protection was
the purpose ofthe diversity clauses of Article III, and those clauses exhaust
the categories of cases in which federal jurisdiction may be conferred for
such purposes. Though the observation is reasonable, it does not
undermine the "federal claim" rationale for upholding the statute in
Osborn. A distinction should be drawn between a statute designed to
29.
30.
31.
32.

O.s6o/-n, 22 U.S. at 871.
Id. at 823.
Id.
tmco/«M(//.s, 353U.S. at475.
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protect certain parties from state court bias and a statute designed to
protect federal rights from state court bias. The diversity provisions may
exhaust the situations in which federal jurisdiction may be granted solely
for the purpose of protecting certain parties against possible bias, but that
leaves Congress with the power to grant jurisdiction to protect federal
rights. In the case of a party created by federal law, such as the Bank, the
party and the law are merged. Federal law gives the Bank the right to
operate. To protect the federal right ofthe Bank to operate thus protects not
just the Bank but also the law creating the Bank.
A fresh look at both the Marshall and Johnson opinions in Osborn
reveals significant support for a "federal claim" reading of that case. First,
Marshall appeared to recognize that, because the Bank was a creature of
federal law, its rights were federal rights. The conventional federal
question/remote possibility interpretation of Osborn, though certainly not
without support in Marshall's analysis, is not the only available
interpretation. The most direct support for the "federal claim" reading is
this paragraph:
The charter of incorporation not only creates [the Bank], but gives
it every faculty which it possesses. The power to acquire rights of
any description, to transact business of any description, to sue on
those contracts, is given and measured by its cliarter, and that
charter is a law of the United States. This being can acquire no
right, make no contract, bring no suit, which is not authorized by a
law of the United States. It is not only itself the mere creature of a
law, but all its actions and all its rights are dependent on the same
law. Can a being, thus constituted, have a case which does not arise
literally, as well as substantially, under the law?''^
Marshall stopped short of espousing a "federal claim" theory, failing to
acknowledge that a purpose of federal jurisdiction over suits brought by the
Bank was to provide a hospitable fomm for the vindication of the federal
rights emanating from the Bank's charter. Instead, he reverted to a
discussion of the centrality to the suit of numerous "questions" of federal
law, such as the right to sue and make contracts and to acquire property,
each of which "forms an original ingredient in any cause" initiated by the
Bank.
It fell to Johnson in dissent to refer to the states' hostility towards the
Bank. Johnson also recognized that one purpose of federal jurisdiction is
the vindication of rights which "'live, move, and have [their] being' in a
law of the United States."^'' But he appears to have reserved this category
for causes of action explicitly granted by federal law. In his view, this
category included only "four or five different actions given by [the Bank's]
33.
34.

Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823.
Id at 887-88.
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act of incorporation; particularly that against the President and Directors
for over-issuing,"^^ because in such cases "the plaintiff must count on the
law itself as the ground of his action."^* He failed to recognize that all of
the Bank's claims had their being in federal law in the sense that they
would not have existed but for the federal law creating the Bank and giving
it the right to contract and conduct other business. Had he done so, he
could have justified the grant of jurisdiction as based on the valid need to
provide a fomm that would not be hostile to those claims.
Johnson's interpretation of "arising under" might be appropriate as a
constmction of the general "arising under" statute, which may be said to
require that the federal claim arise "directly" under federal law." However,
the "arising under" provision of Article III is amenable to a broader
constmction, permitting the conferral of jurisdiction when federal law
creates the claim indirectly, such as by creating the holder of the claim.
Under the constitutional provision, it should have been sufficient that any
action brought by the Bank tmly "has its being" only by virtue of the
federal law that created the Bank and gave it all of its powers.
II
VERLINDEN

It was not until a century and a half after Osborn that a Supreme Court
majority opinion again gave extensive consideration to the scope of Article
Ill's "arising under" clause as applied to the original jurisdiction of the
district courts. This Part argues that the Court's conclusion in Verlinden v.
Central Bank ofNigeria^^ that all suits against foreign states raise an actual
question of federal law under the FSIA provided an unpersuasive
justification for upholding federal jurisdiction. As with Osborn, a "federal
claim" analysis would have provided a more corripelling rationale.
A. Verlinden as a "Federal Question" Case
At issue in Verlinden was the validity of 28 U.S.C. § 1330, which
confers jurisdiction on the district courts in all cases brought against a
foreign state in which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity. The
diversity provisions of Article III authorize jurisdiction over cases between
a State, or citizens thereof, and foreign states, but the plaintiff in Verlinden
was a Dutch corporation, not a State or citizen thereof The Court of
Appeals constmed § 1330 to confer jurisdiction in such cases, but stmck
the section down as exceeding congressional power under Article III.''' The
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 888.
Id.
See Mishkin, supra note 1, at 165.
461 U.S. 480(1983).
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981).
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Supreme Court agreed that the statute conferred jurisdiction over cases
between aliens and foreign states, but upheld the statute as within Article
Ill's "arising under" provision. As in Osborn, the particular case before the
court clearly fell within Article Ill's "arising under" clause, as there was an
actual disputed issue of foreign sovereign immunity in the case. (Indeed,
the district court had held that the defendant was entitled to immunity.'"')
But, again as in Osborn, the Court considered whether the statute would be
valid in all of its applications.
Like Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn, Chief Justice Burger's opinion
for a unanimous Court in Verlinden appeared to view the existence of
"arising under" jurisdiction as tuming on the nature ofthe questions of law
involved in the case. The Court noted that Osborn had been understood as
adopting a "possible federal question" test, and it distanced itself from such
a "broad" reading of the constitutional provision.'" It concluded that it
could uphold the statute without endorsing Osborn's broad test because
every suit brought against a foreign state involves an actual, rather than a
speculative, question of federal law—namely, whether the foreign state is
entitled to foreign sovereign immunity.''^ That question is govemed by
separate provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.''^ Because §
1330 confers jurisdiction only over suits against foreign states in which the
state is not entitled to immunity, the Court reasoned that every case against
a foreign state requires the courts to apply the FSIA's immunity provisions
and hence raises an actual question of federal law.'*''
The Court's conclusion that all suits against foreign states raise an
actual question of immunity under the FSIA is unpersuasive. In any given
case it may be so clear that a foreign state is not entitled to immunity under
the FSIA's immunity provisions that a foreign state would be highly
unlikely to raise a claim of immunity.''^ Indeed, raising the argument in
those circumstances might subject the state's lawyers to sanctions under
Rule 11 .''* If so, then the existence of an immunity issue in any given case
would be a possibility, not a certainty.
The Court's opinion took the position that, because § 1330 makes the
absence of immunity a condition of subject-matter jurisdiction, the federal
court must consider and apply the FSIA's immunity provisions in any case
against a foreign state, whether the foreign state raises a claim of immunity

40. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
41. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 492.
42. Id. at 493-94.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2000).
44. Id.
45. See Eric J. Segall, Article III as a Grant of Power: Protective Jurisdiction, Federalism and
the Federal Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 361, 381 (2002).
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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or not.''^ But this response is unpersuasive given the content of the
immunity provisions ofthe FSIA. Section 1604 ofthe FSIA provides that
states are immune unless the suit falls within one of the exceptions to
immunity found in § 1605.''^ The first of those exceptions is waiver."*' It is
clear, moreover, that a state waives its immunity by failing to raise a claim
of immunity in court.^° Thus, although it is true that objections to subjectmatter jurisdiction are ordinarily not waived by a failure to raise the
objection in court,^' the ordinary mle does not apply in this case because
this particular immunity is defined as being subject to waiver. If the state
does not raise a claim of immunity, there is no need for a court to consider
a claim of immunity on its own motion because, by virtue of § 1605 ofthe
FSIA, the very failure to raise the immunity causes the loss of the
immunity.
The Court might respond that it is only by virtue of § 1605 that there
is no need for the court to consider any issue of immunity under the FSIA
if the defendant does not raise the issue. That is true, but it does not
establish that there is a need in every case to decide an actual question of
federal law. It is also true that the current interpretation of the FSIA's
waiver exception might be challenged, but that fails to distinguish
Verlinden from Osborn, where it was similarly possible that a litigant
might renew a challenge to the Bank's right to make contracts or to sue. It
was enough for the Osborn Court that the issue might be raised, and it was
this aspect of Osborn that the Court in Verlinden refused to endorse. The
fact is that the existence of an actual federal question in a case against a
foreign state is a possibility, not a certainty, and thus the Verlinden Court's
reason for concluding that it did not have to consider the continuing
validity of Osborn's "possible federal question" test was unsound.
B. Verlinden as a "Federal Claim " Case
As in Osborn, a "federal claim" analysis would have provided a more
persuasive rationale in Verlinden for upholding the grant of jurisdiction in
all of its applications. Just as all claims brought by the Bank of the United
States were creatures of federal law and hence federal claims, all claims
brought against foreign states are similarly creatures of federal law and
hence federal claims.^^ In the latter case, the claims were created by federal
47.
48.
49.

Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493.
28U.S.C.§ 1604(2000).
Id § 1605(a)(l).

50.

See JOSEPH W . DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS

454 (Transnational Publishers 2d ed. 2003).
51.

See generally R. FALLON, D . MELTZER & D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL

COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1409 (5th ed. 2003).

52. This argument is developed in Carlos M. Vazquez, Comment, Verlinden B.V. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria; Federal Jurisdiction Over Cases Between Aliens and Foreign States, 82 COLUM. L.
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law not because federal law created the plaintiff and gave it its powers, but
because federal law removed in part an otherwise applicable immunity that
would have shielded the defendant. For most of our history, U.S. courts
adhered to the absolute theory of foreign sovereign immunity, under which
foreign states were immune from all suits brought against them.^^ With the
State Department's issuance ofthe Tate Letter in 1952, we shifted to the
restrictive theory, retaining immunity for the govemmental activities of
foreign states but no longer recognizing their immunity for commercial
activities.^'' We recognized the general immunity of foreign states both
before and after 1952 because that is what was required by intemational
law as interpreted by our courts, taking into account as appropriate the
views ofthe executive." In the FSIA, passed in 1976,^'' Congress codified
the restrictive theory of immunity and added a few additional exceptions
not yet recognized by intemational law. Subsequent amendments have
created additional exceptions, most notably an exception for suits against
certain terrorist states."
Insofar as the FSIA and its amendments created exceptions to the
immunity of foreign sovereigns not previously recognized by intemational
law, actions against foreign states are clearly the creature of federal
statute.^^ Insofar as the FSIA codified exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity already recognized by intemational law, the issue is more
complicated. Such claims might be said to have been created by
intemational law. The modem position is that intemational law has the
status of federal common law.'' If so, then these claims, too, are creatures
of federal law. They were created through the gradual evolution of
customary intemational law, as definitively recognized by the U.S.

REV. 1057 (1982) [hereinafter Vazquez, Federal Jurisdiction Over Cases Between Aliens and Foreign
States].
53. See, e.g.. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, U U.S. 116 (1812); Berizzi Bros. Co. v.
Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1962).
54. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State, to Attorney General, 26
Dept. State Bull. 984-85 (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of Lofidon, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15 (1976).
55. See Verlinden, 46 W.S. at 4ST.
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976).
57. 5ee28U.S.C. §1605(a)(7).
58. To be clear: 1 am not suggesting that, to prevail in a suit against a foreign state, it is
sufficient for the plaintiff to establish that his case falls within one of the exceptions to foreign
sovereign immunity contained in § 1605. That section merely removes the barrier of immunity,
subjecting the foreign state to liability under some other law. My point, however, is that the removal of
the immunity barrier can be said to have created the claim against the state in the sense that, without it,
the claim could not be maintained.
59.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111, editors' note 3 (1987). See

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (citing with approval Philip Jessup,
The Doctrine o/Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 730
(1939)); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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executive branch in the Tate Letter.^" Although the status of customary
intemational law as federal law has been questioned in recent years,*' the
Supreme Court has yet to repudiate the modem position. Its recent
decisions appear, if anything, to reinforce it.*^ We need not resolve that
controversy here, however, as even those scholars who do not regard
customary intemational law generally as federal law presumably would
regard the State Department's recognition of the restrictive theory of
foreign sovereign immunity in the Tate Letter as a federal act transforming
the relevant principle of international law into federal law.*'' If so, then the
Tate Letter is the federal act that created claims against foreign states that
otherwise would not have been maintainable in state or federal courts. In
any event, the subsequent codification of the restrictive theory in a federal
statute should suffice to render such claims "federal claims" for purposes
of Article Ill's "arising under" provision. Even if states were once free to
detemiine the circumstances in which foreign states may be sued, such
determinations are now exclusively a matter of federal law.
The Court of Appeals in Verlinden rejected the argument that "arising
under" jurisdiction could be grounded on the need to decide questions of
foreign sovereign immunity because, in its view, foreign sovereign
immunity is itself a jurisdictional issue.*"* The court believed that basing
federal jurisdiction on the need to apply the very jurisdictional statute
under review would be circular. The concem has some validity. If
Congress enacted a statute conferring federal jurisdiction over certain types
of claims, to defend the constitutionality ofthe law on the ground that there
is a need to interpret and apply the jurisdictional limitation in that very
statute would smack of bootstrapping. (A similar "bootstrapping" criticism
has been directed at Professor Wechsler's version of protective jurisdiction,
discussed in Part III.)
The Supreme Court dismissed the Court of Appeals' concem by
characterizing foreign sovereign immunity as a "substantive" issue, not a
purely jurisdictional one.*^ It is not entirely clear what the Court meant by
"substantive." There is support for the proposition that foreign sovereign
60. See Republic of Aus. v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689-90 (2004) (citing Arias v. S. S. Fletero,
Adm. No. 7492 (E.D. Va. 1952)).
61. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique ofthe Modern Position, UO HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Emest L. Young,
Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 392-94 (2002)
[hereinafter Young, Sorting Out the Debate].
62. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). But cf Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L.
Goldsmith, and David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law and the Continuing Relevance of
Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873 (2007).
63. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights
Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2162 (1999) (post-&/e law of foreign sovereign immunity was
"federal law by virtue of a political-branch authorization").
64.
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 647 F.2d 320, 328 n.21 (2d Cir. 1981).
65.
Ker/;Wen,461 U.S. at493.
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immunity is substantive in the sense that it immunizes the state from
liability to private parties, not just from the jurisdiction of courts.^^ In other
words, someone injured through foreign state conduct in circumstances in
which the foreign state is entitled to immunity lacks not just a procedural
right to come into court, but also a right to recover damages from the
foreign state. Justice Holmes in The Western Maid, considering the
sovereign immunity of the United States, held that the immunity was
substantive in this sense—it did not just close the courthouse door, it
actually prevented a liability from attaching. Thus, even if a court could
somehow obtain jurisdiction, it would have to hold that the United States
was not liable.*^
In a more recent case conceming the retroactivity of the FSIA's
foreign sovereign immunity rules, the Supreme Court equivocated about
whether it regarded the immunity as substantive in this sense.*^ In the end,
however, the validity of § 1330 on a "federal claim" theory does not
depend on whether the immunity is substantive in this sense or merely
procedural. It is enough to save the "federal claim" argument from
circularity that the immunity applies not just in federal courts, but also in
state courts. The provisions of the FSIA specifying the circumstances in
which foreign states can be sued do not relate solely toyec/era/jurisdiction.
Since they govem whether foreign states can be sued at all in the courts of
this country, these rules are precisely analogous to the provisions of the
Bank's act of incorporation giving the Bank the capacity to sue. If the latter
provisions suffice to render all claims by the Bank federal claims, then the
FSIA's provisions withdrawing foreign sovereign immunity should suffice
to do the same.
From the "federal claim" perspective, the principal difference between
Osborn and Verlinden is that, in the latter case, federal jurisdiction was not
conferred primarily to provide a hospitable forum for the vindication of the
plaintiffs federal claim. The purpose of the grant of federal jurisdiction
was to protect the defendant.^' Congress feared bias against foreign states
by juries, and it sought to protect against such bias by authorizing removal

66.
For amplification, see Vazquez, Federal Jurisdiction Over Cases Between Aliens and
Foreign States, supra note 52. Of course, the FSIA confers on foreign states a jurisdictional
immunity—i.e., an immunity from being sued in court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604. The question is whether
it does only this, or whether it also confers an immunity from liability. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (arguably
recognizing an immunity from liability coextensive with the state's immunity from suit). See also infra
note 132.
67. See The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922).
68. See Altmann, supra note 60. For a discussion of this ease, see Carlos M. Vazquez, Altmann
V. Austria and the Retroactivity ofthe Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 3 J. OF INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE
207 (2005).
69. See infra notes 70-71.
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to federal court and banning jury trials there.'"' (The feared bias was not
from state as opposed to federal juries, but from juries as opposed to
judges; removal to federal court was the option chosen either because
Congress believed that it lacked the power to preclude jury trials in the
state courts or because it regarded it as the less intrusive option.) Congress
also thought that the federal courts were likely to be more experienced in
handling the complex commercial cases that the FSIA authorized against
foreign states, and more sensitive to the federal foreign relations policies
likely to be implicated in suits against foreign states.^'
Clearly, Congress has the power to confer "arising under" jurisdiction
to provide a hospitable forum for the vindication of a defendant's federal
rights. The "arising under" clause of Article III authorizes federal
jurisdiction on the basis of a federal defense.^^ Jurisdiction would exist
even if there were no occasion in the case to interpret federal law. For
example, the FSIA entitles foreign states to immunity for their
govemmental as distinguished from their commercial acts (assuming no
other exception to immunity applies).^^ There is no question that Congress
could confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to provide a hospitable
forum for the vindication of that immunity, even if everyone in the case
agreed about the meaning of the terms "commercial" and "govemmental."
Whether the case is based upon a commercial as opposed to a
govemmental act could depend in a given case on whether certain alleged
facts occurred, and the existence of those facts could be the sole disputed
issue in the case. Congress might legitimately want such a case in federal
court because a state court hostile to Congress's decision to retain the
foreign state's immunity for govemmental acts might manipulate its factual
findings to frustrate the foreign state's right not to be held liable for such
acts.
But, if federal jurisdiction served only to ensure a hospitable forum
for that defense. Justice Johnson might reasonably insist that jurisdiction be
deferred until the defense were in fact raised.''' As discussed above, the
constitutional issue in Verlinden would be simple in any case presenting a
70. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 50, at 661; Davis v. McCourt, 226 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir.
2000); In re Delta America Re Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 890, 893 (6th Cir. 1990).
71. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487 at 6612, 6631; DELLAPENNA, supra note 50, at 661. In a series of
eases diseussed in Emest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti: Protective Jurisdiction, Foreign Affairs
Removal, and Complete Preemption, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1775 (2007) [hereinafter Young, Stalking the
Yeti], courts have relied on such policies in holding that federal jurisdiction exists under the general
federal question statute in eases implicating foreign relations. I agree with Professor Young that these
cases are unpersuasive as an interpretation of those statutes, in the light of sueh judicially developed
glosses as the well-pleaded complaint rule. But, in my view, there is no question that Congress could
confer federal jurisdiction in such cases.
72. See, e.g.. Mesa v. Califomia, 489 U.S. 121 (1989).
73. 28U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
74. See Osbom, 22 U.S. at 887-88.
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plausible defense of sovereign immunity. Federal claim analysis is
necessary only for those cases against foreign states presenting no
sovereign immunity issue. The hard case is therefore the one in which there
is no plausible sovereign immunity defense—for example, an action in
which the defendant's acts are clearly commercial and the only question is,
say, how much injury they caused, or whether the defendant was negligent,
or whether the plaintiff should have mitigated. The distinctive feature of
federal claim analysis is that it does not tum on the possibility that
particular federal issues will arise and have to be decided. Rather,
jurisdiction is proper under that theory because all the claims authorized to
be brought in the federal courts are federal claims. In the hard case, the
federal court would not be providing a hospitable forum for the
adjudication ofthe substantive defense that Congress provided. Rather, the
federal forum would be guarding against feared bias toward the holder of
the federal defense, whether or not the defense is raised. Should it matter
under federal claim analysis that jurisdiction is being conferred to provide
a hospitable forum for the party seeking to defeat the federal claim?
The current statutory scheme for general federal question removal
suggests that Congress may confer "arising under" jurisdiction to provide a
less hospitable forum for the holder ofthe federal claim. Under § 1441,^^ a
defendant may remove a suit from state to federal court when the suit could
have been brought in federal court under § 1331.^* As noted, original
jurisdiction exists under § 1331 when the plaintiffs claim is based on
federal law. Thus, § 1441 permits a defendant to invoke the jurisdiction of
the federal courts when the party whose claim is based on federal law
prefers to be in state court, presumably because he believes the state courts
offer a more hospitable forum for his federal claim. It thus appears that,
under § 1441, a permissible purpose of federal jurisdiction is to provide a
hospitable forum to a party seeking to defeat a federal claim. In other
words. Congress may confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to guard
against excessive hospitality towards federal claims.^' It has never been
suggested that § 1441 is unconstitutional when it authorizes jurisdiction in
such cases.
Nor would it make sense to permit Congress to seek to provide a
hospitable forum only to the party whose claim is based on federal law.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000).
76. Id. § 1331.
77. In many eases, one might say that the purpose of allowing defendants to remove when the
plaintiff has a federal claim is instead to promote uniformity in the interpretation of federal law. This
purpose is advanced, however, only when there is a dispute about the meaning of federal law. Yet, as
we have seen, original jurisdiction exists under § 1331 where the plaintiffs claim is based on federal
law, even if there is no disputed issue of federal law. Allowing the defendant to remove such a case
from state to federal court can only serve the purpose of providing a forum that is less hospitable to the
federal rights involved.
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Suppose that Congress created a federal right of action for a certain kind of
harm, establishing a uniform national rule on the subject. Assume further
that, before the enactment of this federal law, most states recognized a
common-law right of action for the harm, but their laws varied
considerably. The laws of some states were more favorable to plaintiffs
while the laws of other states were less favorable. The judges in the former
states could be expected to be excessively hospitable to the new federal
right, while the judges in the other states could be expected to be
insufficiently hospitable. A grant of federal jurisdiction over the new
federal claim will simultaneously guard against both possibilities. Federal
claim analysis shows that both purposes are valid.
There would thus appear to be no constitutional problem when
Congress authorizes federal jurisdiction over claims that it has created for
the purpose of providing a forum that will not be excessively hospitable to
those claims. Congress conferred jurisdiction over claims against foreign
states precisely for that reason. Verlinden is thus best regarded as a federal
claim case.
Ill
PROTECTIVE JURISDICTION

Parts I and II argue that federal jurisdiction exists whenever the
federal claim is a creature of federal law. Federal law might create a claim
by endowing an individual with a particular right, but it might also create
the claim less directly by, for example, creating an entity and endowing it
with the power to contract (as in Osborn), or by withdrawing an immunity
from liability (as in Verlinden). Federal creation of the claim would
support a grant of "arising under" jurisdiction even if the law that governs
the claim is that of a state or a foreign' govemment. These two examples
are relatively unproblematic, as federal law in both cases created a claim
that otherwise would not exist—the first because the party would not
otherwise exist, the second because the defendant was previously protected
by an immunity conferred by principles of intemational law long
recognized by our courts. Federal claim analysis, as defended thus far,
would appear to support the validity of a grant of federal jurisdiction in a
number of contexts that have been regarded as questionable. For example,
the grant of jurisdiction over claims brought by a bankruptcy tmstee
seeking to recover the debts of the bankmpt could be viewed as based on
federal law's creation ofthe tmstee's claim—federal law transfers claims
of the bankmpt to the tmstee.^^ Similarly, the Diplomatic Relations Act
authorizes federal jurisdiction over state-law disputes involving the traffic

78.

Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 471 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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accidents of foreign diplomats, but also creates a "direct action" against the
insurer of a diplomatic or consular official.^'
Other actual or proposed jurisdiction-conferring statutes, however, are
not as easily sustained under the federal claim theory as I have defended it
so far. For example, § 301 ofthe Taft-Hartley Act confers jurisdiction on
the federal courts over actions for violation of labor-management contracts
in industries affecting commerce.^" Before it was construed in Lincoln
Mills as authorizing federal common law-making,^' many courts and
commentators assumed that it conferred jurisdiction over disputes
govemed by state law. The Class Action Jurisdiction Act, a bill introduced
in 1969 but never enacted, would have conferred federal jurisdiction over
certain consumer actions based on state law.^^ More recently, in response
to the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, which creates a federal
right of action incorporating "the law, including the choice of law
principles, of the State in which the crash occurred unless such law is
inconsistent with or preempted by federal law."^^
To address the constitutionality of jurisdictional grants such as these,
it is necessary to explore the outer bounds of the "federal claim" thesis.
Accepting a withdrawal of immunity as sufficient to ground a grant of
federal jurisdiction raises the question whether Congress may confer
jurisdiction by conferring an immunity and then partially (or completely)
withdrawing it. If Congress had the power to confer the immunity in the
first place, then it is not obvious why the later withdrawal of the immunity
would not count as a federal creation ofthe claim. If Congress can create a
claim this way in two steps, why not in one? Questions such as these
suggest that implications of "federal claim" analysis are broader than they
first appeared. Indeed, in the light of such questions, "slippery slope"
concems might lead the reader to question the soundness of the "federal
claim" analysis of Osborn and Verlinden.
In this Part, I will argue that the implications of "federal claim"
analysis are indeed broader. "Federal claim" analysis tells us that Congress
may confer jurisdiction over a category of federally-created claims, not just
to secure better interpretations of federal law, but to provide a more (or
less) hospitable fomm for the adjudication of such claims. If Congress can
79. Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (1978).
80. Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, § 301 (1947) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-196(1994)).
81. LincolnMills, 353U.S. at457.
82. S. 1980, 91st Cong. (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. REC. 10, 460-61 (1969). See infra text
accompanying notes 100-107.
83. Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230, § 408(b)(l), (2) (2001). The "unless" clause does not
seem to add anything to the Supremacy Clause unless "inconsistent with" is construed as broader than
"preempted by." The Act also imposes a damage cap as a matter of federal law. Id. § 408(a).
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confer jurisdiction for this purpose when the federal claim would not exist
but for federal law, then it should be able to do so when it has a special
interest in a preexisting category of claims (assuming its interest in those
claims falls within one of its legislative powers). Thus, I argue, if Congress
has legislative power under Article I, it should be able to "create" federal
claims by throwing a federal cloak around an already existing category of
claims, declaring them to be federal while specifying that the goveming
law will remain as before. In other words. Congress should be able to
confer jurisdiction by declaring a category of existing claims to be federal
claims govemed by incorporated state or foreign law. My proposal adds a
largely formal requirement to Professor Wechsler's protective jurisdiction
theory—the requirement of formal adoption of state law as federal. This
requirement addresses both formal and substantive objections that some
scholars have voiced about Wechsler's theory.
A. Theories of Protective Jurisdiction
The reluctance of judges and commentators to endorse the broad
"remote possibility" test for which Osborn is thought to stand has led to the
elaboration of altemative tests. Some of these tests have come to be known
as theories of "protective jurisdiction." The jurisdictional grant that was the
immediate inspiration for the best known theories of protective jurisdiction
was § 301 ofthe Taft-Hartley Act, which authorized federal jurisdiction
over claims to enforce labor-management contracts. The two most famous
articulations of protective jurisdiction theories—those of Professors
Wechsler and Mishkin—were based on the assumption that such contracts
would be govemed by state law. Professor Wechsler took the position that,
as long as Congress possessed the power to displace state law in a given
area. Congress could take the less intmsive step of allowing state law to
continue to govem while conferring federal jurisdiction on any case falling
within the area.^" He thought it perverse to insist, in the name of
federalism, that, in order to confer federal jurisdiction. Congress must
displace substantive state law.^^ His argument was later taken up by
Professors Bickel and Wellington:
In the fmal analysis the question is this: In exercising its now vast
powers under the commerce clause or indeed any of the established
powers must Congress, before it is free to employ the federal court
system for the effectuation of its object, go the full length of
displacing state substantive law? . . . The point is simply that
providing a fomm for the enforcement of a state law in a field
which Congress could occupy is itself a species of regulation, a
84. Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision ofthe Judicial Code, 13 LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224-25 (1948).
85. Id. at 225.
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way of seeking a degree of uniformity while leaving the maximum
room for the exercise of initiatives by the states. ^*
Thus, according to Wechsler's theory of protective jurisdiction it should
not be necessary for Congress to displace state substantive law in order to
confer the federal jurisdiction it deems necessary to effectuate its
established powers.
.
Professor Mishkin's theory was somewhat narrower. Concemed that,
under Wechsler's theory, there would be no federal statute under which the
case could be said to arise except the jurisdictional statute itself. Professor
Mishkin proposed limiting Congress's power to confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts to fields in which congressional legislation manifests an
"articulated and active federal policy."^' Under Professor Mishkin's theory.
Congress would be able to confer jurisdiction over all cases in such a field,
whether or not the particular-case was govemed substantively by federal
law. Under Mishkin's theory, the case would "arise under" the statutes
articulating the federal policy, and the point of such jurisdiction would be
to ensure that even state-law cases are resolved in a way that protects those
federal policies.^^
According to both theories, federal jurisdiction serves to protect
federal interests in a preemptible field. The main difference is that
Wechsler would permit a grant of federal jurisdiction even if Congress has
not previously exercised its power to legislate substantively in the field,
whereas Mishkin would require some previous exercise of this legislative
power.
The protective jurisdiction theories have gamered only mixed support
in academia.^' The Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed such a
theory. In Lincoln Mills, Justice.Frankfurter considered and rejected both

86. Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. I, 19-20 (1957).
87.
Mishkin, supra note 1, at 192.
88.
Id. at 195 ("Even in cases where no specific statutory provision is itself involved, the overall
federal policy thus may nonetheless be better protected if all connected litigation is adjudicated by
eourts well versed in, and receptive to, the national policies established by the legislation.").
89.
For generally favorable treatments, see Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The Theory of Protective
Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933 (1982); Segall, supra note 45; Loretta Shaw, Comment, A
Comprehensive Theory of Protective Jurisdiction: The Missing "Ingredient" of "Arising Under"
Jurisdiction, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1235 (1993); George D. Brown, Beyond Pennhurst—Protective
Jurisdiction, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in
Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REV. 343 (1985). For generally unfavorable treatments, see
Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction ofthe Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV.
542 (1983); Note: Over-Protective Jurisdiction?: A State Sovereignty Theory of Federal Questions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1948 (1989); John T. Cross, Congressional Power to Extend Federal Jurisdiction to
Disputes Outside Article III: A Critical Analysis from the Perspective of Bankruptcy, 87 NW. U. L.
REV. 1188 (1993); James E. Pfander, The Tidewater Problem: Article III and Constitutional Change,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1925 (2004); Young, Stalking the Yeti, supra note 71.
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theories,'" while Justices Burton and Harlan endorsed the concept of
protective jurisdiction without elaboration." (Burton and Harlan expressed
agreement with Judge Magruder's opinion in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. W.L. Mead, which declined to explore the outer limits of
protective jurisdiction but endorsed a version along the lines of Professor
Mishkin's.'^) More recently, in Mesa v. California, the Court narrowly
construed a statute conferring removal jurisdiction over suits against
federal officers in order to avoid the "grave constitutional questions" that
would be presented by a broader construction.'^ The Court read the statute
as permitting removal only when the federal defendant raises a federal
defense, believing that a contrary constmction would pose potential
constitutional problems by pennitting a case to arise under the very statute
that confers jurisdiction. Recognizing that the broader construction might
have been proper under a theory of protective jurisdiction, the Court
asserted that it had never found the need to adopt such a theory and that
there was no need to do so in the case before it because it had not been
demonstrated that state courts were hostile to federal officers.''* Thus,
although the Court has never rejected the theories, its reluctance to endorse
them reflects a decided skepticism.
B. "Federal Claim " Analysis and the Adoption Approach
Before the Supreme Court obviated the Article III issue surrounding §
301 by holding that the provision authorized the articulation and
enforcement of a federal common law of labor-management contracts,
several lower courts considered the constitutionality of § 301 on the
assumption that suits brought under it would be govemed by state law. As
noted. Judge Magmder would have upheld the.section as a valid conferral
of protective jurisdiction. In Textile Workers Union v. American Thread
Co.^^ Judge Wyzanski suggested an altemative rationale. He noted that
"[t]here is no doubt that under Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 3 ofthe Constitution
Congress can direct that controversies affecting commerce shall be
govemed by state law,"'* and that "if Congress did enact such a law,
controversies arising thereunder could be heard by a duly authorized court

90. Textile Union Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 469-84 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
91. Id. at 460 (Burton, J., concurring in the result).
92. 230 F.2d 576, 580-82 (1 st Cir. 1956).
93. Mesa V. Califomia, 489 U.S. 121, 122(1989).
94. W. at 137-38.
95. 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
96. Id at 140 (citing Ky. Whip & Collar Co. v. 111. Cent. R.R. Co., 299 U.S. 334; Williams v.
Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, and Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367 (Bankruptcy Act); Williams v. United
States, 327 U.S. 711 (Assimilative Crimes Aet); Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, reh'g denied, 312
U.S. 668 (admiralty)).

1752

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1731

established under Article III of the Constitution."'^ Justice Frankfiarter in
Lincoln Mills understood Wyzanski to be suggesting "that § 301 might be
read as containing a direction that controversies affecting interstate
commerce should be govemed by federal law incorporating state law by
reference, and that such controversies would then arise under a valid
federal law as required by Article III."'^ Frankfurter reserved judgment on
whether federal jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law adopting
state law would satisfy Article III, concluding that § 301 could not be
constmed as such an adoption.^'
In the late 196O's, Judge Wyzanski's adoption theory was the
apparent basis for the proposed Consumer Class Action Act (S. 3092)
proposed by Senator Tydings."'° This bill was Senator Tydings's second
attempt to grant federal courts jurisdiction over consumer claims. His
earlier bill, the Class Action Jurisdiction Act (S. 1980),'°' would have
conferred jurisdiction on the district courts over state-law civil class actions
brought by consumers or potential consumers. The purpose of conferring
federal jurisdiction was "to counterbalance restrictive State attitudes
toward consumer class actions," and to "make[] available the refinements
of contemporary Federal court practice, including Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, the most modem class action procedure in the United
States."'"'^ In support of congressional power to confer such jurisdiction,
the Senator cited Professor Mishkin's "Federal 'Question'" article.'"^ With
his substitution of S. 3092, the Senator apparently hoped to obviate
questions about the validity of protective jurisdiction by employing an
adoption approach.'"" Specifically, S. 3092 provided that "State law
relating to the consumers' rights under State statutory or decisional law is
adopted as Federal law," and that "Federal law applicable to each case
shall be fashioned upon the law of the State and the State statutory and
decisional constmction shall be applied as if jurisdiction of the Federal
97. Id (citing Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1952)).
98. 353 U.S. at 473 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
99.
Id. ("Whatever may be said of the assumption regarding the validity of federal jurisdiction
under an affirmative declaration by Congress that state law should be applied as federal law by federal
courts to contract disputes affecting commerce, we cannot argumentatively legislate for Congress when
Congress has failed to legislate.").
100.
S. 3092, 91st Cong. (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. REC. 32,141-42 (1969).
101.
S. 1980,91st Cong. (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. REC. 10,460-61 (1969).
102.
115 CONG. REC. 10,460 (statement of Sen. Tydings).
103.
Id
104.
See Letter from Charles L. Black, Jr. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School, to
Hon. Bob Eckhardt (May 27, 1969), reprinted in Hearings on Class Action and Other Consumer
Protection Procedures Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. (2d Sess. 23 (1970)) [hereinafter Black Letter] ("Part of
the thought behind this provision, doubtless, is that actions, brought under the laws which thus become
a part of federal law, will indisputably 'arise under' the laws ofthe United States, and so satisfy beyond
doubt the requirements of Article III.").
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court were based on diversity of citizenship."'"^ The bill thus made it clear
that the content ofthe applicable federal substantive law would be identical
to the law that would have been applied in the absence ofthe Act. S. 3092
thus clearly presented the question whether a naked adoption of state
substantive law as federal could be the basis of a grant of federal "arising
under" jurisdiction to the district courts.'"^ The question did not receive a
judicial answer, however, because the Consumer Class Action Act never
became law.'"^
There is no doubt that Congress can adopt state law as federal law.
The issue has arisen most prominently with respect to legislation enacted
pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause 17, which gives to Congress the
power "[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation" with respect to certain federal
enclaves. From the beginning, the laws that Congress enacted for such
enclaves incorporated the laws of the surrounding states. Initially,
Congress followed a policy of "static conformity," incorporating state law
as it stood at the time ofthe enactment ofthe federal statute.'"^ Eventually,
Congress shifted to dynamic incorporation, adopting the laws of the
surrounding states as they stood at the time of the acts giving rise to the
litigation. The Supreme Court upheld such adoption of state law in United

105. S. 3092,91st Cong. § 4(c)(l), (2) (1969).
106. Hereinafter, I shall use the term "naked adoption" to describe a statute providing that the
substantive law to be applied is to be the same as the law that would be applied in the absence of the
statute in state courts or in federal courts having diversity jurisdiction. But cf infra text accompanying
notes 146-148 (noting that the combination of state substantive law and federal procedures may be said
to produce a hybrid federal claim).
107. A quarter century later. Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. 109-2,
119 Stat. 4 (2005) [hereinafter CAFA]. Ironically, this law was enacted to provide a less hospitable
forum for certain class action claims. See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Defendant's Obligation to Ensure
Adequate Representation in Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 511, 529, n.l 11 (2006). This time.
Congress relied on the diversity clause of Article 111 rather than the "arising under" provision. CAFA at
§4. The diversity clause of Article III has been construed to authorize a grant of jurisdiction on the
basis of "minimal diversity." See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967). In
CAFA, Congress conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts over "any civil action in which the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class
action in which any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant,
any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and any
defendant is a citizen of a State, or any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any
defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state." § 4(a)(2). The availability of
jurisdietion based on minimal diversity largely obviates the protective jurisdiction question for statutes
such as CAFA, which are likely to involve at least one party from a different state than another. But cf
James E. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, Aggregate Litigation, and the Limits of Article III, 95 Calif.
L. Rev. 1423 (2007) (questioning the constitutionality of jurisdiction based on minimal diversity in part
because it would permit evasion of Article Ill's "arising under" clause). In any event, as diseussed
above. Article Ill's "arising under" clause permits the conferral of jurisdiction for the purpose of
providing a less hospitable forum for the adjudication of federally-created claims.
108. See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 291 (1958). See generally William Cohen,
Congressional Power to Validate State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 387,401-05(1983).
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States V. Sharpnack,^'^^ specifically rejecting the dissent's claim that such
adoption constituted an unconstitutional delegation of law-making power
to the states."" The Court cited a number of other contexts in which
Congress had adopted state law as federal law.'"
Whether federal "arising under" jurisdiction can validly be based on a
naked adoption of state law as federal is of course a separate question.
Judge Wyzanski cited Mater v. Holley^^^ as having upheld federal
jurisdiction over a case arising under a federal law incorporating state law.
Mater was a civil action for negligence within a federal military
reservation. The court held that, when the land was transferred by Georgia
to the United States for this purpose, "Georgia law as such, and by virtue of
Georgia sovereignty ceased to exist, but remained operative as federal law
by virtue ofthe sovereignty ofthe United States.""^ The court cited, as
presenting an analogous problem, James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula,^^'^
which "held that a section of the New York Labor Law . . . remained in
effect 'as federal law' on lands ceded to the United States for a post office
site.""' It also cited a statute, 16 U.S.C. § 457, which it described as
"expressly adopting as federal law the local law of liability for negligence
and wrongful death for places over which the United States has exclusive
jurisdiction.""^ The court in Mater held that the suit arose under federal
law even though the goveming federal law incorporated the law of Georgia
by reference."' Mater, however, was a lower court decision, and it might
be distinguished on the ground that state law in that case was incapable of
operating of its own force. Whether a naked adoption of state law as
federal suffices to ground federal "arising under" jurisdiction outside a
geographical area that is "exclusively federal" by virtue of the Constitution
thus remains an open question.
Federal claim analysis supports an affirmative answer. It tells us that
Congress can confer jurisdiction on federal courts for the purpose of
providing a more (or less) hospitable forum for the litigation of claims it
has created, whether or not the case requires the construction of federal law
or the application of such law to facts. Jurisdiction exists over all such
claims even if the substantive federal law goveming such claims is
identical to the laws of some states on the subject."^ The question is
109. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286.
110. See id. at 297-99 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
111. W. at294-96.
112. 200 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1952).
>•
113. W. at 124.
114. 309 U.S. 94(1940).
115. Mater, 200 F.2d at 124.
116. Id
117. Id
118. In determining whether a case arises under a federal law for purposes if Article 111, the
Court has never asked whether the federal law differs in substance from the law that would apply if
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whether jurisdiction can validly be granted when the substantive federal
law goveming such claims is identical to the laws of each of the states. A
requirement that the content ofthe federal law be different from that ofthe
otherwise applicable state or foreign law might make sense if the reason for
federal jurisdiction were to provide a more expert or sympathetic forum for
the interpretation ofthe law."' However, as Professor Mishkin has taught
us, this is not the sole purpose of federal jurisdiction. Congress can confer
jurisdiction instead because it believes the federal courts will be more (or
less) hospitable to a particular category of case, even when the case
presents no occasion to interpret the substantive law or determine how it
applies to particular facts—when the only issue is, for example, whether
certain alleged facts even occurred. If Congress has the power to create a
federal claim on a matter, but Congress's only concem with the status quo
relates to the procedures used in the state courts or the state courts'
attitudes towards such claims, there would appear to be no reason to deny
Congress the power to throw its cloak around such claims by declaring
them to be federal and, in this way, to make available the procedures or
attitude it prefers.
The differences between naked adoption and protective jurisdiction as
techniques for conferring federal jurisdiction over claims govemed by state
or foreign law may strike some readers as too formal to be of constitutional
significance. Both supporters and opponents of protective jurisdiction have
regarded the adoption approach as a circumvention of the limits that
Article III places on "arising under" jurisdiction. In their view, the
adoption technique must stand or fall with protective jurisdiction. Those
who are unpersuaded by protective jurisdiction theories regard the adoption
technique as equally invalid,'^" and those persuaded by protective
jurisdiction theories regard adoption as superfluous.'^'
It is true that the difference between adoption and Wechsler's version
of protective jurisdiction is largely formal. Under both approaches, the
operative constraint on Congress is its power under Article I to legislate on
there had been no federal law. But cf infra note 130 (discussing Goldberg-Ambrose's approach to
Diplomatic Relations Act).
119. Even so, as noted, this has never been a requirement.
120. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 89, at 558 ("Incorporation alone should not suffice . . .
to fit the claim within a conventional interpretation ofthe arising under clause of article III because
incorporation of state law does not generate any new independent federal rights."); Young, Stalking the
Yeti, supra note 71, at 1802-05.
121. See Note, Protective Jurisdiction and Adoption as Alternative Techniques for Conferring
Jurisdiction on Federal Courts in Consumer Class Actions, 69 MICH. L. REV. 710, 731 (1971) ("The
use of adoption and incorporation of state law solely as a means of providing federal-court jurisdiction
should not be countenanced unless the result is one that can be reached within the bounds of a
constitutionally valid theory of protective jurisdiction."). Cf Black Letter, supra note 104, at 23
("firmly adher[ing]" to earlier conclusion that a simple grant of jurisdiction, without more, would be
constitutional, but going on to conclude that adoption "furnishes a sound altemative theory on which
constitutionality . . . may be based.").
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certain subjects. Por Wechsler, Congress's power to legislate on these
subjects entails a power to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts with
respect to those subjects without legislating substantively. The adoption
approach requires two steps in place of Wechsler's one. Congress must
first enact a federal law declaring that claims in the relevant area shall be
deemed federal claims, although the governing federal law shall have the
same content as the otherwise applicable law. Having done so, Congress
can enact a statute conferring jurisdiction over such claims. If Congress is
willing to pass a bare jurisdictional grant, it is also very likely to be willing
to pass a naked adoption of state law.
Nevertheless, the adoption approach improves upon Wechsler's
suggested approach in two ways. First, it addresses the frankly formal
objections to Wechsler's theory. Second, the designation of the relevant
claims as federal claims addresses the objection that, by authorizing federal
courts to interpret and apply state law. Congress is blurring lines of
accountability. In addition, closer examination ofthe adoption option helps
bolster the case for the validity of Wechsler's theory in two ways. First, the
quest for a line distinguishing adoption that suffices to ground "arising
under" jurisdiction from adoption that is insufficient to do so demonstrates
the inadministrability of any such distinction. Finally, the attempt to draw
such a line underscores the strength of Wechsler's original structural
argument for protective jurisdiction and the perversity of objections to it.
Professor Wechsler's original proposal may well have been
constitutionally sound. The refinements of Wechsler's proposal introduced
by the adoption approach should eliminate any lingering constitutional
doubts.
I. A Formal Solution to a Formal Problem
While the differences between adoption and protective jurisdiction
might strike some readers as too formal to matter, it should be recalled that
the principal objections to Professor Wechsler's theory raised by Justice
Frankfurter and Professor Mishkin were precisely that—formal. In
rejecting Wechsler's analysis in Lincoln Mills, Justice Frankfurter stressed
that the restrictions of Article III were "truly technical," and thus were not
"met or respected by a beguiling phrase that the greater includes the
lesser."'^^ That Frankfurter might have accepted a truly technical solution
to this truly technical problem is suggested by the fact that he rejected
Wechsler's theory while reserving judgment on Wyzanski's.'^^
Professor Mishkin's principal objection to Wechsler's theory was
similarly formal: he was concerned that, under Wechsler's approach, there
would be no federal law under which the case would arise other than the
122.
123.

Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 474 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
W. at 472-73.
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jurisdictional statute itself'^'' Similarly, the "grave constitutional
problem[]" that led the Supreme Court in Mesa v. California to construe
the federal officer removal statute as conferring jurisdiction only when the
defendant relies on federal law was the fact that there would otherwise be
no federal law under which the case could be said to arise.'^^
The
problem that concerned Mishkin and the Mesa Court would disappear if
Congress enacted a federal statute adopting state law as the governing law.
The case would then arise under the provision adopting state law as
federal, thus rendering all such claims federal claims.
2. How Much State Law Must Be Displaced?
If a naked adoption of state law as federal were not accepted as a
permissible basis for conferring "arising under" jurisdiction, it would be
necessary to formulate a basis for distinguishing adoption that does suffice
to ground federal jurisdiction from adoption that does not suffice. The line
to be drawn presumably would have to rely on the amount of state law that
is displaced. The more state law is displaced, the more likely a grant of
jurisdiction is to be valid. The question would be: How much state law
must be displaced for a federal adoption of state law validly to ground a
conferral of "arising under" jurisdiction?'^* Drawing and administering
such a line would pose enormous challenges.'^^ This section discusses the
difficulties of articulating and enforcing such a line, and argues that federal
claim theory in any event requires the rejection of any line that would
preclude Congress from conferring jurisdiction on a subject over which it
has legislative power.
It is clear that a case may "arise under" federal law for purposes of
Article III if it is based on a federal law that adopts state law in some
respects and alters state law in other respects. Federal common law
provides an example. Even where federal common law applies, the content
of that law is often the same as state law.'^^ In Lincoln Mills, for example.
124. Mishkin, supra note 1, at 190.
125. 489 U.S. 121, 137(1989).
126. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 89, at 547 ("[W]e must classify cases requiring
protective jurisdiction by identifying the point at which there is insufficient federal law to establish that
the claim involved arises under federal law, at least in the constitutional sense of that term.").
127. The irony that such an approach validates a jurisdictional grant only if Congress intrudes to
a greater extent on substantive state law will be discussed below. My point for now is that, even if such
distinctions were not perverse from a federalism perspective, it would be very difficult to draw a line
between sufficient and insufficient displacement of state law.
128. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979) ("Controversies
directly affecting the operations of federal programs, although governed by federal law, do not
inevitably require resort to uniform federal rules."); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956). See
generally Paul Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice
of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957). In Kimbell Foods, supra,
federal jurisdiction under Article III did not depend on the "arising under" clause because the United
States was a party. Nevertheless, in the light of the Court's statement that the case was "governed by
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the majority noted that the federal court could adopt state law as the
governing rule.'^' It is also clear that a suit within the scope of § 301 arises
under federal law even when the particular case is governed by an adopted
state-law rule.'^" Thus, there is no requirement that the rule that governs
the particular case be one that is not adopted from state law. If a naked
adoption of state law cannot ground a grant of "arising under" jurisdiction,
then it will be necessary to determine how much state law irrelevant to the
particular case must be displaced for that case to "arise under" federal law
for the purposes of Article III.
Another section of the FSIA helps illustrate the difficulty of the linedrawing problem. Section 1606 ofthe FSIA provides as follows:
As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is
not entitled to immunity . . ., the foreign state shall be liable in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances; but a foreign state . . . shall not be liable for
punitive damages; if, however, in any case wherein death was
caused, the law of the place where the act or injury occurred
provides . . . for damages only punitive in nature, the foreign state
shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages measured by the
pecuniary injuries resulting from such death which were incurred
by the persons for whose benefit the action was brought.'^'
federal law" even though the relevant federal law adopted state law, 440 U.S. at 727, it is clear that the
case also arose under federal law for purposes of Article III.
129. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457 ("[S]tate law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may
be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy. Any state law applied,
however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights.) See
also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) ("In our choice ofthe applicable
federal rule we have occasionally selected state law.").
130. Professor Young agrees. See infra text accompanying note 138 (discussing Young's
approach to damage caps). Professor Goldberg-Ambrose has suggested that a § 301 suit between two
labor unions might not properly arise under federal law in light of the Supreme Court's suggestion in
United Association of Journeymen v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 627 (1981), that the federal rule
applicable in such cases "might consist entirely of incorporated state law." See Goldberg-Ambrose,
supra note 89, at 560. Her conclusion appears to be based on the notion that a case arises under federal
law for purposes of Article III only when the applicable law differs in substance from the rule that
would apply without a federal law. Thus, she suggests that a suit under the Diplomatic Relations Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1364, which authorizes direct actions against insurers of foreign diplomats in certain
circumstances, would arise under federal law if the otherwise applicable state law did not authorize
direct actions against insurers, but would not arise under federal law if the otherwise applicable state
law did authorize direct actions. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 89, at 555. As noted above, supra
note 118, showing that the governing federal law differs in substance from the otherwise applicable law
has never been a requirement ofthe "arising under" statute or the "arising under" clause of Article III.
In indicating that the federal common law rule might adopt state law, the Court did not suggest in
Lincoln Mills or Clearfield Trust or Journeyman that federal jurisdiction would be affected by that
choice. (To be precise. Professor Goldberg-Ambrose states that Journeymen suits under § 301 and suits
under the Diplomatic Relations Act in states with direct action statutes would not arise under federal
law without reliance on a theory of protective jurisdiction. However, she is critical of theories of
protective jurisdiction and would accept them only in limited circumstances.)
131.

28U.S.C. § 1606.
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This provision might be understood as a federal adoption of state law. It
specifically instructs courts to apply the otherwise applicable state or
foreign law to determine the extent ofthe foreign state's liability.'^^ This
federal adoption of state law would suffice to save § 1330 if a naked
adoption of state law were recognized as a legitimate basis for "arising
under" jurisdiction.'^^
Even if a naked adoption were not accepted as a basis for conferring
federal jurisdiction, § 1606 might save § 1330 because the former alters the
applicable substantive law in certain respects. It states that, if death occurs
and the otherwise applicable law provides only for punitive damages, the
foreign state would be liable for compensatory damages instead. It even
specifies how such compensatory damages are to be measured. Clearly, a
case would uncontroversially arise under federal law if death occurred and
the otherwise applicable law provided only for punitive damages. The
court would then have to rely on § 1606 as the sole basis ofthe damages it
was awarding in the case. Does the fact that § 1606 is the sole affirmative
source of damages in this small subset of cases mean that all cases under §
1606 arise under federal law for purposes of Article III? If not, how much
more state law must be preempted before a federal statute adopting state
law may support "arising under" jurisdiction?
Section 1606 can be expected to play a significant substantive role in
a much larger set of cases insofar as it preempts state law authorizing
punitive damages. Where state law authorizes punitive damages and the
facts would support an award of such damages, a conferral of federal
jurisdiction would serve to provide a hospitable forum for the federal rule
denying such damages. But would this degree of federal displacement of
state law suffice to ground federal jurisdiction over a case where the facts
would not support an award of such damages under state law? What about
a federal statute that adopts state law except insofar as it authorizes
punitive damages exceeding compensatory damages, or exceeding twice
the amount of compensatory damages, or five times that amount?''''' What
132. This provision also supports the "federal claim" view defended in Part II. The argument
would be that, before the emergence ofthe restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity, because of
the absolute immunity of foreign sovereigns, state law did not extend to foreign sovereigns. Later, by
virtue of § 1606 itself (or the principles of international law that § 1606 codified), foreign sovereigns
became legally liable for injuries caused in certain circumstances. In this sense, claims against foreign
sovereigns were created by § 1606, in conjunction with § 1605. For elaboration, see Vazquez, Federal
Jurisdiction Over Cases Between Aliens and Foreign States, supra note 52.
133. Admittedly, Frankfurter might require a more explicit statement that state law was being
adopted as federal law. Short of such a statement, the provision might be read simply to make clear that
the otherwise applicable law was not being altered except in the limited circumstances mentioned. If a
clearer statement were required, however, it could easily be supplied.
134. Professor Young appears to accept the validity of a grant of jurisdiction for suits arising
under a federal statute that adopts state law but imposes a damage cap. In discussing the Air
Transportation and Safety and System Stabilization Act, he writes that "by limiting an air carrier's total
liability to the limits of the carrier's insurance coverage, the Act restricts the operation of state law in
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about a federal law placing a cap of $200,000,000,000 on punitive
damages?'^^ Difficult line-drawing inquiries such as these would be
avoided under a naked adoption approach.
One line that could conceivably be drawn would accept federal
"arising under" jurisdiction on the basis of a federal statute adopting state
law if Congress in addition authorized the courts to depart from state law to
the extent they found such law to conflict with federal policy. Lincoln Mills
itself shows that Congress may confer jurisdiction if it is concemed that
state law, in some applications, might conflict with federal policy. If
Congress has instructed the federal courts to apply state law to the extent
consistent with federal policy, federal jurisdiction would be proper over all
cases in the field because the possibility of conflict exists in every case and
Congress's purpose in conferring jurisdiction is to protect the substantive
federal policies in the field.'^* By contrast, a federal law that merely adopts
state law as federal, or adopts state law except on specified issues, does not
authorize the federal courts to depart from state law in other respects and
does not evince a concem about the content of undisplaced state law.
Before discussing whether the line should be drawn where Congress
not only adopts state law but authorizes departure when the adopted law
conflicts with federal policy, it is worth noting that this proposed line
would validate federal adoption of state law for the purposes Professor
Mishkin sought to advance in his theory of protective jurisdiction. Indeed,

an important class of cases. That restriction in itself may constitute a federal 'element' sufficient to
support Article III jurisdiction under Osborn, at least for claims against air carriers." Young, Stalking
the Yeti, supra note 71, at 1789. If he is suggesting that jurisdiction may be conferred only if federal
law alters state law "in an important class of cases," he may not accept such jurisdiction if the cap is so
high as to be implicated only in extraordinary cases.
135.
Section 1606 may alter state law in another respect. Some lower courts have interpreted
this section as instructing the courts to articulate and enforce a federal common law choice of law rule
for FSIA cases. The courts that have read § 1606 this way have selected the "most significant
relationship" test ofthe Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws as the federal choice of law rule. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145. Again, it should be clear that a case arises
under federal law for purposes of Article 111 when the choice of law rule that would apply in the
absence of § 1606 is a rule other than that of the Second Restatement. The Court has recognized that
choice of law is a substantive issue for Erie purposes. Klaxon Co. v. Stcntor Electric Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487, 496 (1941). By virtue of § 1606, federal law determines which substantive law will be
applied to resolve the case on the merits. It does so by incorporating a state or foreign rule rather than
by providing a rule of its own, but the choice ofthe goveming rule is itself designed to achieve federal
poliey interests. The question, then, is whether the case would arise under federal law for purposes of
Article III in all FSIA cases or just in the cases in which the otherwise applicable choice of law rule
differed from the federal choiee of law rule. A constitutional test that turned on such a comparison
seems implausible.
136.
Professor Young agrees:
[E]very time a court deciding a case within the scope of federal common lawmaking authority
elects to apply state law, it must decide whether the particular state rule in question creates a
conflict with federal policy. .. . This federal element is at least as substantial as that presented
by the federal status ofthe Bank in Osborn.
Young, Stalking the Yeti, supra note 71, at 1786 (emphasis in original).
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on this view, adoption could be used to confer jurisdiction over a
somewhat broader category of cases than Mishkin would allow, as it would
not be necessary for Congress to have legislated an "articulate and active"
policy in the field. The relevant federal policy could come instead from
other sources.'^^ This adoption approach would be more restrictive than
Professor Mishkin's approach only insofar as it would require Congress
formally to adopt state law as federal law and authorize the federal courts
to depart from state law if necessary to protect federal policies.
Although it is clear that a statute of the sort described above would
validly support federal "arising under" jurisdiction, there are significant
reasons for doubting that this should be the only sort of adoptive statute
that can do so. It would be odd to say that federal jurisdiction would exist
when Congress delegates to the courts the power to preempt some state
law, but not when Congress itself specifies the extent of preemption. In the
former case, federal jurisdiction would be justified because of the need for
federal courts to make jtidgments in every case about the extent to which
state law impinges upon federal policy. Federal claim analysis shows,
however, that federal jurisdiction is necessary in the latter case to provide a
hospitable forum for the vindication of the policies Congress has enacted.
For example, if Congress enacts a statute creating a federal right of action
for the enforcement of certain contracts affecting interstate commerce,
specifying that such actions shall be governed by state law except to the
extent such law authorizes punitive damages, federal jurisdiction over such
claims would be justified to guard against state courts vitiating the damage
limitation by, for example, manipulating compensatory damages. In his
contribution to this symposium. Professor Ernest Young appears to agree
that "arising under" jurisdiction can be conferred over cases arising under
such a statute, even if the federal alteration of state law is not implicated in
the particular case, as long as the alteration implicates "an important class
of cases."'^^ If so, the line-drawing problem recurs.
Another possible line would allow a case to arise under a federal
statute adopting state law as long as it displaces (or authorizes the courts to
displace) some substantive state law, no matter how little. If this were the
only requirement. Congress would have very little difficulty meeting it,
particularly if "substance" were understood to include such matters as
remedy and choice of law (as it should be). The trouble with drawing the
line here is that it would preclude Congress from conferring federal
jurisdiction to promote procedtiral policies. Numerous actual or proposed
jurisdictional grants have sought to take advantage of the procedural
137. See Vazquez, Federal Jurisdiction Over Cases Between Aliens and Foreign States, supra
note 52, at 1083 (arguing that § 1330 could be upheld under Mishkin's theory of proteetive jurisdiction
even though the relevant federal policies to be protected would not have emanated from Congress).
138. Young, Stalking the Yeti, supra note 71, at 1789 (discussing damage caps).
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advantages ofthe federal courts. As noted, Congress in enacting § 1330
wanted to give foreign states the. ability to avoid jury trials.'''' The FSIA
also authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction on the basis of
minimum contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than minimum
contacts with a particular state, as the Due Process clause would require in
the state courts.'''" The Class Action Jurisdiction Act and the Consumer
Class Action Act would have conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts in
certain suits brought by consumers for the purpose of making available to
plaintiffs the class action procedures available in federal courts.''" In the
bankruptcy context, federal jurisdiction was desired in part to permit easier
coordination and transfer of cases.'""^
If Congress believes that state procedural rules adversely affect
interstate or foreign commerce, then it is not obvious why Congress should
be barred from addressing that problem by making available the federal
procedures that it regards as preferable. Conferral of federal jurisdiction
may be the only way for Congress to address the problem. The altemative
would be to impose the preferred procedures on the state courts. But
certain procedures could not be imposed on state courts (such as the
exercise of personal jurisdiction on the basis of contacts with the nation as
a whole'''^), and others could not be advanced except in a national judicial
system (such as promotion of ease of transfer). Professor A.J. Bellia has
made a forceful argument that the Constitution altogether prohibits
Congress from imposing procedures on the state courts in state-law
cases.''*'' If so, then Congress's only option would be to confer federal
jurisdiction. To deny Congress the power to promote procedural policies
by conferring federal jurisdiction would effectively deny Congress the
power to promote those policies at all. The constitutional basis for reading
Article III to deny Congress the power to address interferences with
interstate commerce caused by state procedural rules is elusive.''*'

139.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6631-32 (1976); DELLAPENNA, supra note 50, at 660-61.
140.
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k) advisory committee's note (amended 1993).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 100-107.
142.
Susan Block-Lieb, The Case Against Supptementat Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A
Constitutional. Statutory, and Policy Analysis, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 792 (1994); Cross, supra
note 89, at 1238; Thomas Galligan, Article III and the 'Related To' Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Case
Study in Protective Jurisdiction, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 6 (1987).
143.
Personal jurisdiction in state courts is governed by the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which requires minimum contacts with the state. Personal jurisdiction in
federal courts, on the other hand, is governed by the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment,
which permits the exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of minimum contacts with the nation. See, e.g..
United Rope Distribs., Inc. v. Seatriumph Marine Corp., 930 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1991).
144.
See generally Anthony J. Bellia, Federal Regulation of State Procedures; 110 YALE L.J.
947(2001).
145.
Even if the Constitution does not prohibit Congress from imposing procedures on state
courts. Professor Bellia has persuasively shown that doing so would be severely intrusive. Bellia, supra
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As Professor Bellia and others have observed, state substantive rules
are adopted against the background of state procedural rules, and the latter
are often designed to interact with the former.''** To engraft federal
procedural rules to state substantive law is effectively to create a new
hybrid claim.''*' This is, of course, a reason for Congress to be cautious in
conferring federal jurisdiction over claims governed by state substantive
law or imposing federal procedures on state-law claims litigated in state
court. It should also be clear that Congress lacks the power to impose
federal procedures if it lacks the power to legislate substantively. But, if
Congress has the power to legislate substantively over a given class of
cases, the very fact that state substantive law will be accompanied by
different procedures makes the claim created by the naked adoption of state
substantive law a distinctly federal claim. As Charles Black said about the
proposed Consumer Class Action Act, by making the class action
procedure available, "this bill . . . would be in effect creating a new joint
right of action, and whether you call that right substantive or procedural is
material for law students in a jurisprudence course, but not for the practical
concerns of Congress. It is in effect something new, a new species of
right."'''^ A hybrid claim of this sort should be deemed to arise under the
federal law that created it. If the engrafting of federal procedures were
recognized to create a hybrid claim arising under federal law, then naked
adoption would appear to permit a grant of jurisdiction unless Congress
specifies that the federal courts are to apply state procedures, which it is
very unlikely to do.
Would a grant of federal jurisdiction be valid if Congress adopted
even the procedures of the states? Again, federal claim analysis suggests an
affirmative answer. As discussed above, federal claim analysis tells us that
Congress can confer jurisdiction over a category of federal claims for the
purpose of making available a more (or less) hospitable forum. It is for this
reason that federal jurisdiction is appropriate when federal law creates the
right of action even when the case presents no dispute about the meaning
or application of federal law. The desire to provide a more (or less)
hospitable forum would appear to justify federal jurisdiction as well when
Congress has the constitutional power to legislate on the subject but has no
objection to existing law with respect to both substance and procedure.
note 144, at 989. From the states' perspective, conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts instead
would appear to be the preferable option.
146. Bellia, supra note 144, at 994.
147. Id. at 995. See also Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 89, at 605 ("If a federal court utilizing
more liberal federal class action procedures entertains claims arising under these state laws, the state's
policy may be significantly distorted.").
148. Hearings on Class Action and Other Consumer Protection Procedures Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st
Cong. 26(1970).
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Because the subject is within Congress's legislative power, Congress has a
constitutional basis for caring ho,w these cases are resolved. If a desire to
provide a more (or less) hospitable forum is a valid reason to confer federal
jurisdiction over federal claims governed by federal law that displaces state
law, then it should be an equally valid reason to confer jurisdiction over a
category of claims over which it has legislative power and is willing to
declare to be "federal," even if it wishes the cases to be resolved through
the application ofthe otherwise applicable law.
3. The Perversity of Requiring Greater Displacement of State Law
Even if a stable line could be drawn as to the degree to which a
federal statute must displace state law before it may ground "arising under"
jurisdiction, the search for the line reveals a deeper problem. A statute
adopting state law as federal would stand a greater likelihood of supporting
"arising under" jurisdiction if it displaced more state law. It would be more
likely to fail the test if it displaced less state law. If the point of
jurisdictional limits imposed by Article III is to protect the states, it is
perverse to require Congress to displace more state law to successfully
confer federal jurisdiction when its legitimate purposes would be served by
displacing less. This is, of course, the central structural insight on which
Professor Wechsler based his theory of protective jurisdiction. The greater
power to confer federal jurisdiction by displacing substantive state law
includes the lesser power to confer federal jurisdiction without displacing
state law.''" It is a powerful argument for accepting Wechsler's theory of
protective jurisdiction, and it is even more powerful as an argument for
accepting a congressional authority to confer federal jurisdiction through
the adoption of state law as federal.
Article Ill's enumeration of categories of cases within the federal
judicial power serves to protect the constitutional prerogatives ofthe states,
just as Article I's enumeration ofthe powers of Congress serves to protect
the states. The potential scope of federal jurisdiction under Article III is
thus a federalism issue. Reading Article III too broadly offends state
interests by withdrawing too many cases from the exclusive jurisdiction of
the states' courts. Under the "arising under" provision, however, one way
that Congress can withdraw cases ft-om the exclusive jurisdiction of state
courts is by enacting a substantive federal law displacing state substantive
law that would otherwise govern such cases. The question before us is
whether federal jurisdiction can be conferred where Congress could
displace state law but prefers not to. If Congress's purposes are served by
the mere conferral of jurisdiction, and those purposes fall within
Congress's Article I power, then it would be perverse to allow Congress to

149.

See Wechsler, supra note 84, at 238-40.
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confer jurisdiction over such cases only if it takes the additional step of
displacing substantive state law. Conferring federal jurisdiction by
displacing state law is more intrusive from a federalism perspective than
conferring federal jurisdiction without displacing state law.
There are circumstances in which the law imposes on an actor the
choice between acting fully (or meeting a minimum threshold) or not at all.
But the exceptional and disfavored nature of such a choice is suggested by
the name we have given it—a Hobson's choice. Such Hobson's choices
have been rejected in the Article III context. The greater power not to
create lower federal courts at all has been understood to include the lesser
power of creating them but giving them less than the full permissible
jurisdiction under Article III. The argument that Article III leaves Congress
with the choice of either creating lower federal courts and granting them
the full jurisdiction permitted by Article III or not creating lower federal
courts at all has been dismissed by the Court out of hand.''°
When we do accept such Hobson's choices, it is for policy reasons
that show the choice not to be illogical. For example, we permit a person to
stand by while a stranger drowns, but if he chooses to come to the rescue,
we hold him to a minimum level of competence. The greater power to
stand by does not include the lesser power to rescue negligently because,
by coming to the rescue, the incompetent good Samaritan makes it more
difficult for a competent good Samaritan to act effectively. When we take
account of the need to leave open the possibility of a competent rescue, it
turns out that an incompetent rescue is worse than no rescue at all. Thus,
rescuing incompetently is not a "lesser" option included in the power to
stand by without acting.
Some scholars who have criticized Professor Wechsler's claim that
the greater power to displace state law includes the lesser power of
conferring federal jurisdiction without displacing state law appear to
contest the very idea that the existence of a greater power presupposes the
existence of a lesser one. For example, it has been noted that, even though
Congress has the power to decline to flind certain activities altogether, it
lacks the power to decide to fund such activities only for people of certain
races or religions.'^' This example, however, does not contradict the claim
that a greater power includes a lesser one. It merely illustrates that powers
can be said to be "greater" or "lesser" along any number of dimensions.
Thus, while the power to deny fiinding altogether may be greater than the
power to deny fiinding to the activities of certain races from the perspective
of the Spending Power, it is not a greater power from the perspective of the

150.
151.

Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850).
Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 89, at 590, n.261.
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Equal Protection Clause.'" The Equal Protection Clause measures policies
according to an anti-discrimination metric. From this perspective, the
power to deny funding based on race is clearly the greater power. The trick
is to identify the correct axis along which to measure the extent of the
power. Because the scope of Congress's power to confer jurisdiction on
federal courts is a federalism issue, the relevant metric is the extent to
which the exercise ofthe power would impinge upon state interests.
Scholars have also argued that, even using the proper metric, the
power to displace state law substantively is not greater than the power to
confer jurisdiction without displacing state law. One version of this
argument stresses that, while a displacement of state law would intrude
upon state interests to a greater extent if passed, a mere conferral of
jurisdiction would be much easier to pass.'^^ The claim appears to be that
an easier-to-enact option is more of a threat to state interests (and thus a
"greater power" from a federalism perspective) than one that is more
difficult to get enacted.
The validity of this objection to Wechsler's argument is questionable
even in theory. Professor Michael Herz, whose article points out a number
of respects in which "greater-includes-the lesser" arguments can be a trap,
thinks that this particular objection is not valid:
It is more a political than a legal argument. In certain
circumstances, those challenging a particular exercise of
govemment authority will happily call the govemment's bluff,
willing to mn the (minimal) risk that the govemment will exercise
its theoretical power to make them even worse off than by the
exercise ofthe lesser power. This is rather like the prosecutor who
chooses not to have the jury instructed as to a lesser included
offense, predicting that it is unlikely to convict on the offense
charged and not wanting to give it any other option than acquittal.
Just as the mere fact that the attomey is willing to mn the risk does
not mean that the jury cannot convict of the offense charged, so it
is not clear why the unlikelihood that the govemment would
exercise its greater power means it is unable to exercise the lesser.
Even if the greater power has disappeared for all practical
purposes, why did it take the lesser with it? If the question is
whether the Constitution constrains certain activity (the lesser), the
152. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court's reliance on the argument that "the greater
power includes the lesser" in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Board of Puerto Rico, 478
U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986), was questionable. See id. at 355 n.4 {Brennan, J., dissenting); Michael Herz,
Justice Byron White and the Argument That The Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227,
270 & n.l46 (1994) (discussing Posadas). It is for the same reason that, from the perspective of the
Equal Protection Clause, the power not to establish lower federal courts does not include the power to
limit their jurisdiction to suits brought by persons of a particular race or gender.
153. Young, Stalking the Yeti, supra note 71; Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 89, at 591
(displacement of state law may not be "realistically open to Congress").
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fact that non-constitutional considerations constrain other, greater
measures is beside the point. '^'^
,:.,
The "easier-to-enact" objection seems particularly misguided here.
While it may be true that a statute that displaces state law would be more
difficult to enact than a statute that merely confers jurisdiction, it is
important to recall that the reason that a statute substantively displacing
state law would be more difficult to get enacted is precisely because it is
more intrusive of state interests. Far from showing that the naked
jurisdictional grant is not a lesser power, the comparative ease of enacting
such a law merely shows that the political process is operating to protect
the states from the more intrusive option. It is not clear why the fact that
the political process is working to protect the states from a more intrusive
option should be a reason to deny Congress the power to pass a less
intrusive option for which there is sufficient support.
Professor Young argues that the comparative difficulty of enacting a
statute that substantively preempts state law does not necessarily mean that
the political process is successfully protecting the states' interests, but may
instead reflect the difficulty of getting agreement in both Houses of
Congress on the relevant substantive rules. But there is no requirement that
Congress agree on all the substantive rules. As we have seen (and as
Lincoln Mills illustrates) Congress can instead instruct the federal courts to

154. Herz, supra note 152, at 241-42. See also John H. Garvey, The Powers and the Duties of
Government, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 209, 216 (1989) ("The problem with [the argument that the
'greater' option is not in practice available] is that it confuses 'ought' with 'can.' . . . Think about the
ultra vires doctrine . . . . The charter of X Corporation permits it to boycott Y Corporation, but X's
board of directors would never agree to such a proposal. The board would agree to buy from Y only at
a lower price. Is this proposal ultra vires? Probably not. If boycotts are OK, less drastic measures
probably are too. It is a question of what the charter allows. The board's approval has no bearing on that
question."). It is also noteworthy that the power to disestablish the lower federal courts is thought to
include the power to limit their jurisdiction even though it would clearly be much easier to do the latter
than the former.
Professor Herz briefly considers Justice Frankfurter's objections to Wechsier's "greater-includesthe-lesser" argument. While noting that Frankfurter did not elaborate as to why he was rejecting the
argument, Herz suggests that the explanation might have had to do with the strength of the federal
government's justification for the grant of jurisdiction. Herz recognizes that, "in terms of the intrusion
on state authority, to open the federal courts to state claims is "less" than supplanting state law
altogether." Herz, supra note 152, at 249. But he suggests that, "if the federal interest justifying [the
opening of the federal courts to state claims] is proportionately even smaller [than the federal interest in
supplanting state law altogether] then the first might be unconstitutional even though the second is not."
Id. I suppose this might be true if the constitutional test turned on the strength of the state interest in
conferring jurisdiction. But the constitutional test for the validity of jurisdiction-conferring statutes
does not tum on the strength of Congress's interest in conferring federal jurisdiction. Surely Frankfurter
was not contemplating such a test when he spoke of the "truly technical requirements of Article III."
Moreover, if the test did tum on the strength of the federal interests, it would be necessary first to
consider the sorts of interests that would be legitimate. For the reasons I discussed above, a federal
interest in providing a more (or less) hospitable forum is a legitimate federal interest under Article III.
Whether this interest is strong enough to justify a grant of jurisdiction over any particular category of
cases within Congress's Article I powers is a judgment that in my view belongs to Congress.
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develop federal rules in common-law fashion. Professor Young regards
prevailing doctrine on this point to be mistaken. He argues that Congress
should not be allowed to delegate largely unguided law-making power to
the courts. Be that as it may, my proposed construction of Article III takes
existing doctrine outside Article III as its starting point. It assumes that
Congress can adopt state law, and that it can preempt state law, as it did in
Lincoln Mills, by instructing the courts to articulate and enforce federal
mles (or adopt state rules) to accord with general and largely unarticulated
federal interests.
Scholars have attempted to articulate a constitutional policy that
would make it logical to permit Congress to confer "arising under"
jurisdiction only where substantive state law is displaced. In my view, the
arguments are unpersuasive. One such argument emphasizes that one
purpose of Article III (or the Tenth Amendment) is to protect the states'
control over the interpretation and application of state law.'^' Thus,
Professor Young argues that protective jurisdiction threatens "the state
courts' supremacy as expositors of state law."'^* And Professor GoldbergAmbrose is concemed that "protective jurisdiction . . . results in loss of
control by state citizens over the development of state law" because it
"den[ies] state citizens the opportunity to influence such decisions through
the direct or indirect selection of state judges."'"
That this argument is off-base is suggested by the fact that the adopted
law will not always be state law. If a federal statute adopts the "otherwise
applicable law," the adopted law will sometimes be foreign. Presumably,
any objection to protective jurisdiction would have to be based on the fact
that the goveming law is non-federal, not that it is state law. Of course, the
choice of foreign law will usually be dictated by state choice-of-law
mles—but not always. The Due Process clause will sometimes require the
application of foreign law.'^^ Even if foreign law is being applied because
state choice-of-law mles dictate, the link to the state's interest in
controlling the interpretation and application of its own law seems
exceedingly tenuous when the substantive law being applied is that of a
foreign country.
In any event, it cannot be said that the Constitution gives the state
courts exclusive power to interpret and apply state law. State law is
frequently applied in the courts of other states. Federal courts apply state
law in diversity actions, and even to resolve particular issues in actions

155. See Carol E. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 89, at 595-602; Young, Sorting Out the
Debate, supra note 61, at 426; Note, Over-Protective Jurisdiction?, supra note 89, at 1956-63.
156. Young, Stalking the Yeti, supra note 71, at 1799.
157. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 89, at 604.
158. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (diseussing Due Proeess limits on
choice of law).
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arising under federal law.'^' The application ofthe law of a sister state and
federal application of state law in suits arising under federal statutes cannot
be distinguished on the ground that state law is being applied in such
circumstances out of deference. The same could be said when Congress
establishes a federal claim pursuant to its undoubted Article I power but
specifies that it shall be govemed by the otherwise applicable state law.
Congress could have displaced the state law but chose not to do so.
It has been argued that federal application of state law in diversity
cases is less threatening to the states' power to control the interpretation of
their own law than a federal grant of jurisdiction over a particular class of
cases because the existence of diversity is fortuitous and unpredictable,
whereas a grant of "arising under" jurisdiction poses a more systematic
threat to the state's interest in controlling the interpretation of particular
categories of state law.'*° But, if Congress could have preempted that
category of state law altogether, it is unclear how the states are worse off
with a naked adoption accompanied by a jurisdictional grant. Surely the
states' ability to interpret and apply state law in a given field is affected
even more by congressional displacement of state law in the field. Where
state law is being applied by federal courts pursuant to federal adoption,
state law is no longer being applied as state law. The state's interest in
controlling the interpretation and application of its own law is respected by
the state courts' exclusive jurisdiction (absent diversity or ancillary
jurisdiction) over state law falling outside the scope of the adoption.
Indeed, where Congress decides to retain state law as the goveming law in
a federal right of action, the state courts' interest in controlling the
interpretation of state law is being respected even more than when it
displaces state law. Although cases within the scope of the adoption would
mostly be litigated in federal courts, state courts would retain the power to
interpret particular issues of state law in cases falling outside the scope of
the adoption, and those interpretations would have to be followed by the
federal courts if the same issues arose in cases falling within the scope of
the adoption.
As noted above, a grant of federal jurisdiction would clearly be valid
if a federal statute adopted state law while authorizing departures from the
state courts' interpretation in the event of a conflict with federal policies."''
159. See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (holding that state law determines
who is a "child" for purposes ofthe Copyright Act).
160. See Young, Stalking the Yeti, supra note 71, at 1801 (emphasizing that diversity
jurisdietion, unlike protective jurisdietion "does not remove entire categories of state claims from state
eourt cognizance"; federal jurisdiction in diversity cases is "sporadic" and "not concentrated in
particular area of state law"); Note, Over-Protective Jurisdiction?, supra note 89, at 1960; GoldbergAmbrose, supra note 89, at 607 ("What distinguishes protective jurisdiction from diversity, pendent or
ancillary, or other-state jurisdiction . . . is its systematic displacement of state courts.").
161. Professor Young agrees. See Young, Stalking the Yeti, supra note 71, at 1786 (arguing that
a statute authorizing federal common law-making in such a fashion could be the basis for "arising
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If so, then it seems paradoxical to object—based on the threat to the states'
interest in controlling the interpretation of their own law—where Congress
has directed closer adherence to state court interpretations, as the
Consumer Class Actions Act would have done.'^^ In sum, from the
perspective of a state's interest in interpreting and applying its own law, it
would appear that congressional displacement of state law is at least as
objectionable as congressional conferral of federal jurisdiction based on
federal adoption of state law in a given field.
Professor Young has also argued (without "press[ing] the . . . criticism
too far"'*^) that protective jurisdiction is problematic because it is an
affront to the dignity of state courts. The "state dignity" rationale has been
controversial when invoked as a reason to entitle states to an immunity
from being sued without their consent.'*'' As a basis for rejecting a
particular constmction of a constitutional grant of jurisdiction, it seems to
prove too much, given that Article III explicitly authorizes federal court
jurisdiction over state-law suits based on assumptions that might be
similarly offensive to the dignity of the state courts. Justice Story's
response when the Virginia Court of Appeals invoked a similar dignitary
concem is worth considering here:
Admitting that the judges of the state courts are, and always will
be, of as much leaming, integrity, and wisdom, as those of the
courts of the United States, (which we very cheerfully admit,) it
does not aid the argument. It is manifest that the constitution has
proceeded upon a theory of its own, and given or withheld powers
according to the judgment ofthe American people, by whom it was
adopted. . . . The constitution has presumed (whether rightly or
wrongly we do not inquire) that state attachments, state prejudices,
state jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes obstmct, or
control, or be supposed to obstmct or control, the regular
administration of justice. Hence, in controversies between states;
between citizens of different states; between citizens claiming
grants under different states; between a state and its citizens, or

under" jurisdietion because "every time a court deciding a case [under such a statute] elects to apply
state law, it must decide whether the particular state mle in question creates a conflict with federal
policy").
162. Professor Young fears that protective jurisdiction would promote "substantive law 'creep'"
even when Congress disavows any intent to preempt substantive state law, see Young, Stalking the Yeti,
supra note 71, at 1799, but it is difficult to see why this should be an Article III problem if a
eongressional statute mandating application of state law unless such law conflicts with federal policy
would pass muster, as he concedes, see id. at 1785-1786.
163. Young, Stalking the Yeti, supra note 71, at 1799.
164. As Professor Young notes, this rationale played a role in cases such as Fed. Mar. Comm 'n
V. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002). For criticism ofthe "dignity" rationale, see Judith
Resnik & Julie Chi-hyc Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of
Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1962 (2003); Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in CrossDoctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003).
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foreigners, and between citizens and foreigners, it enables the
parties, under the authority of congress, to have the controversies
heard, tried, and determined before the national tribunals. No other
reason than that which has been stated can be assigned, why some,
at least, of those cases should not have been left to the cognizance
ofthe state courts.'*^
Of course, one might distinguish between affronts to state-court dignity
that violate Article III and those that do not, but then we would have to
answer the constitutional question before concluding that the state court's
dignity has been invalidly offended. In any event, a grant of jurisdiction
over a federal claim adopting state law would not "have as its sole
justification a belief in the inadequacy of state tribunals in determining
state law."'^^ As explained above. Congress would be conferring
jurisdiction in such cases not to ensure a more correct interpretation of the
law, but to provide a more (or less) sympathetic forum for the adjudication
of certain categories of claims. The grant reflects a judgment about the
dispositions of state courts as compared to federal courts, not their legal
competence.
Other scholars have objected that denying state courts control over the
interpretation and application of state law infringes the constitutional
interest in maintaining clear lines of accountability between the
govemment and the governed.'*^ Professor Goldberg-Ambrose presciently
invoked such concems as a reason to invalidate grants of protective
jurisdiction years before the Supreme Court embraced them as a reason to
reject federal laws that commandeer state legislatures'^^ and state executive
officials.'*^ In New York v. United States, the Court struck down a statute
requiring state legislatures to legislate in a federally prescribed way
because,
where the Federal Govemment directs the States to regulate, it may
be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval,
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.
Accountability is thus diminished . . . .'™
The Court in Printz v. United States invoked a similar accountability
concem in striking down a statute requiring state executive officials to

165. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
166. Young, Stalking the Yeti, supra note 71, at 1799 (quoting Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 475
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
167. See Carol E. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 89, at 600 (1983).
168. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
169. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
170. AfewKor/t, 505 U.S. at 168-69.
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enforce a federal regulatory program.'^' Similarly, Professor GoldbergAmbrose argues that "[ajccountability is disturbed by the confiasion of
authority and control."'^^ If the federal courts are given jurisdiction over
claims govemed by state law, "state officials [will] lack control over those
claims, [but] state citizens will hold them responsible because the claims
are . . . under state law."'^^
There are two principal problems with the accountability argument
when employed as a criticism ofthe naked adoption approach.
First, the Supreme Court has recognized that the blurring of lines of
accountability is not constitutionally problematic when the courts of one
govemment are required to enforce laws created by the other. It has
recognized that state courts can be required to enforce federal law despite
the possibility that the states might be erroneously blamed for the federal
policies it is enforcing. That is because the Supremacy Clause expressly
requires state judges to enforce federal law.'^"* Presumably, the court would
reach the same conclusion where Article III authorizes the federal courts to
entertain claims based on state law, as it clearly does in diversity cases or
where a state claim is ancillary to a federal claim.'^^
Second, the Supreme Court decisions resting on the blurring of lines
of accountability assume that, if confusion results, it will adversely affect
the govemment whose officers are enforcing the law, not the govemment
whose law is being enforced. Thus, according to the Court in Printz, the
accountability problem produced by a federal law commandeering state
executive officials is that "it will be the [state official] and not some federal
official who stands between the gun purchaser and immediate possession
of his gun. And it will likely be the [state official], not some federal
official, who will be blamed for any error . . . that causes a purchaser to be
mistakenly rejected."'^* In other words, the problem is that the public will
171. Printz, 521 U.S. at 930 (holding that federal commandeering offends aecountability
because state officials are "put in the position of taking the blame for [the] burdensomeness and . . .
defects" of federal programs).
172. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 89, at 604. See also id. at 600 (state autonomy "insures that
citizens will 'know whom to hold accountable'" (quoting Lewis Kaden. Politics. Money and State
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 857 (1979); Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note
89, at 602 ("The public . . . seems unable to separate the bearer of bad tidings from the true source of
the law.").
173. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 89, at 605.
174. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 907; New York, 505 U.S. at 178.
175. Professor Bellia has argued that the Tenth Amendment does place some limits on
Congress's power to commandeer state courts. Specifically, he argues that Congress must take state
courts as it finds them and thus cannot require them to adjudicate state claims using federallyprescribed procedures. See Bellia, supra note 144, at 959. Even if he is right, it does not follow that
Congress may not authorize/e(/era/ courts to adjudicate state claims according to federal procedures.
Much less does his argument suggest that Congress cannot authorize federal courts to adjudicate federal
claims incorporating state law by reference.
176. Pnnte, 521 U.S. at 930.
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erroneously blame the messenger. Thus, while it may be tme that "[t]he
public . . . [is] unable to separate the bearer of bad tidings from the tme
source ofthe law,"'" the constitutional problem the Court has identified is
that the public will erroneously blame the bearer of the bad tidings instead
of the tme source of the law. If so, then the states' interests are not
adversely affected when federal courts are authorized to adjudicate claims
govemed by state law. If there is an accountability problem, it is that the
federal govemment will be mistakenly blamed for policies having their
source in the states.
Even this problem would be solved by a federal statute adopting the
state law as federal law. Given such adoption, it would not be a mistake for
the federal govemment to be blamed for the policies being enforced by the
federal courts. The federal govemment should be held accountable for its
decision to adopt state law. The problem that Professor Goldberg-Ambrose
identifies exists where the claims being enforced by the federal courts are
"nominally under state law."'^^ If so, then there would appear to be no
problem with federal courts enforcing claims that are "nominally" federal
even if the relevant federal law adopts state law.
In short. Professor Wechsler was right to maintain that the greater
power to displace state substantive law in a given field includes the lesser
power to grant jurisdiction over cases within that field. Any plausible
objection based on the state courts' interest in maintaining control over the
interpretation and application of their own law would be adequately
addressed by the enactment of a federal law making it clear that federal
courts adjudicating cases in the field are enforcing state law only because
that law has been adopted by Congress as federal law. Such an adoption
would also make it clear to anyone who cares that Congress rather than the
states should be blamed for the relevant policies.
CONCLUSION

This Article advances a "federal claim" rationale for upholding
statutes conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts that builds upon
Professor Mishkin's key insight that the purpose of the district courts'
original jurisdiction under Article Ill's "arising under" provision is not
solely, or even primarily, to resolve federal questions. Another, potentially
more important purpose, is to provide a more (or less) hospitable fomm for
the adjudication of rights created by federal law. For purposes of the
"arising under" statute, jurisdiction exists if federal law created the
plaintiffs claim by providing the substantive law being applied. For
purposes of the parallel provision in Article III, it is enough if federal law
creates the claim by creating the party or by removing an otherwise
177.
178.

Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 89, at 602.
W. at 605.
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applicable immunity. Additionally, Congress may create a federal claim by
taking a category of preexisting state claims and declaring them to be
federal claims govemed by adopted state la\y. If Congress objects to the
attitudes of state courts with respect to a particular category of claims
falling within its legislative power, but has no objection to the applicable
state substantive laws, it should be able to advance its interests by
declaring the claims to be federal claims and conferring federal "arising
under" jurisdiction over them. Federal claim analysis tells us that Congress
may confer jurisdiction over claims created by federal law for the purpose
of providing a more (or less) hospitable fomm for their adjudication. This
is a valid purpose of a grant of federal jurisdiction even if the federal law
goveming the claims consists entirely of adopted state law.

